

## **The World After Sept. 11: A Clash of Civilizations?\***

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I am really delighted to be back addressing this Forum. It was quite a few years ago when I last spoke here. It seems like a different age, before the Asian financial crisis. I think a lot has happened since then. In particular, a great deal has happened in the past six months. I live and teach in Washington, D.C., and I must say that for a resident of Washington it has been impossible to think, write or talk about anything other than Sept. 11 ever since that happened.

I was in my office in downtown Washington the morning of the attacks. We were watching on television what had happened to the World Trade Center and then, all of a sudden, someone pointed out the window and there was a big column of smoke coming up from the plane that had crashed into the Pentagon. It was a matter of some personal concern to me because I had quite a number of good, close friends who worked in the Defense Department. So I spent that whole day trying to find out if they were safe. It turned out they all were, but it has certainly affected a lot of people's thinking about the shape of the post-Cold War world.

I think there have been a lot of clichés generated about the consequences of Sept. 11. The world will never be the same anymore and that it has changed in certain fundamental ways. I do think that there is probably one fundamental change that has taken place as a result of those attacks. It was a demonstration of the extreme vulnerability of a modern technological society to a group of people with a sufficient level of motivation. I don't want to credit Osama bin Laden with anything in particular, but there was a certain genius to the attacks in the way that it used two symbols of a modern technological society—an airliner and a skyscraper—and brought them together in this utterly original way to produce the kind of devastation that it did.

If you read through the literature that had been written on terrorism prior to

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Sept. 11, most terrorist experts discounted the possibility of mass casualty terrorism. They argued in fact that most people over-estimate the threat posed by terrorism because it involves usually bombs and the killing of, at most, a dozen or two dozen people. The reason that we did not take this kind of vulnerability seriously was that in a certain sense, no one believed that there were people in the world evil enough to perpetrate this kind of attack that involved killing themselves as well as the killing of thousands of innocent people. We now unfortunately know that that is entirely possible.

I want to talk a little bit about what the world is like and how this affects different ways of understanding what is going on in world politics. I take as my reference point the debate that Samuel Huntington and I have been engaged in over the last decade. I put forward my own "End of History" hypothesis back in 1989, in which I argued that world politics is essentially being structured by the progress of modernization. The achievement of science and technology has led to the kinds of institutions that are needed to create a modern technological civilization, which in economics is a centralized market economy and in the sphere of politics is a modern liberal democracy. The belief was that this was the essential movement and dynamic of world politics. The End of History simply referred to the fact that unlike previous generations, we did not see a further stage to which we were going to evolve. We are no longer convinced that we were going to evolve to socialism; that modern democracy and capitalism seem to be the terminus point of that historical evolution.

Now Samuel Huntington a few years later published his book "The Clash of Civilizations". He was a teacher of mine at Harvard. We are good friends, although we completely disagree on the nature of world politics. He argued, in a certain sense, the exact opposite of my view. He said that modernization was very superficial. It produced what he called the Davos Man. I assume a lot of you are going to attend the World Economic Forum in New York at the end of the month, so you are part of this Davos Man that he rejects as a significant social phenomenon. He argues that world politics will be structured according to different cultural values and the seven or eight major civilizations into which the world is divided; that we will not have an increasingly peaceful world as democracy and markets spread through the

process of globalization, but a world that will be fractured by conflicts across these cultural boundaries.

These two views—the end of history and the clash of civilizations—have become standard readings in introductory international relations courses. A lot of college freshman are asked to pick the view they believe best describes the world. I must say that since Sept. 11, the end of history view has been losing out to the clash of civilizations view. You had Osama bin Laden who got up and said to everyone that this, in fact, was a clash of civilizations; that there is a fundamental irreconcilable difference between Islamic values and Western values and that that is the fight he is pursuing.

But the bottom line of my talk is that I think I am still right. Now, I do not like authors who cling stubbornly to views that they have expressed simply because they do not have the imagination to see that the world has changed. But I think that the world has not changed in a serious way as a result of Sept. 11. I believe that the whole process of modernization—both political and economic—is and remains the dominant force that structures world politics. Osama bin Laden and the kind of Islamic radicalism that he represents constitutes a desperate rear guard action by a people or a society that is threatened by this process of modernization. But there is ultimately no way they are going to win the struggle. Indeed, they have not won military in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, I do think that the kind of challenge that he represents is a serious one. It is not a challenge that has disappeared with the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. I think this challenge is going to lead to a struggle that will persist for years, and even possibly for decades. It is necessary to think about what that challenge really represents. In a certain sense, the best symbol of what that challenge is, is the terrorist Mohammed Atta. He was the pilot on the lead plane that crashed into the World Trade Center. You might argue that the terrorists living in Afghanistan in caves represent a very primitive form of social life that rejects modernity. In fact, Mohammed Atta was not that. He was an engineer. He came from a middle class family in Egypt. He studied in Hamburg and lived for some years in the United States.

There is a feeling that many people in the West have that people in less developed countries would like to live in the West if only given the chance, which seems to be confirmed by the great flood of immigrants from third world countries to developed countries. Yet, in Mohammed Atta you had an individual that saw the West, that lived and benefited from the material comfort that it provided and yet, somehow, hated that society sufficiently to perpetrate the act that he did. This indicates that the appeal of that kind of modernized western society may not be as universal as we would think.

Let me step back a little bit and explain why I think I'm right and why it is that I think that this larger process of modernization is, in fact, going to be the one that will dominate world politics. Let me begin with a question of culture. Samuel Huntington argues that world politics will be structured along cultural lines and that those will be the key sources of friction and conflict. I do not for a minute deny that culture is extremely important. In fact, my last couple of books, "Trust" and "The Great Disruption", have really dealt with the question of values and how important values are to the functioning of a modern, liberal democracy. I do not deny Huntington's point that western values are distinctive and that there is a cultural background to the whole process of modernization.

Modernization is not just a series of impersonal institutions that are rationally functional and therefore universally adopted by everybody. There are certain cultural preconditions for developing a modern, technological, capitalist society. There are also certain cultural conditions that are necessary for developing a functioning democracy. Not every society can modernize in an economic and political sense in equal ease because not all of them have the requisite cultural values that enable this sort of modernization to take place.

It is further not an accident, as Huntington himself has argued, that modern liberal democracy sprang up first in the Christian West because there is a historical relationship between Western Christianity and the development of modern liberal democracy. Christianity, in a sense, was a doctrine that created the belief in individualism and the belief of a transcendent God and a series of laws that governed the universe that are not seen in the apparent,

visible world. It embodied support for the doctrine of universal human equality and dignity. As many philosophers, including Hegel and Nietzsche and Tocqueville, have all argued, you can understand modern liberal democracy as a secularized form of Protestant Christianity.

The question is, with this historical origin of liberal democracy in a Christian society, once liberal democracy is created, is it simply a cultural by-product of the way people live—their habits and traditions—in a certain part of Western Europe? This is, in effect, Samuel Huntington's argument, that there is nothing universal about democracy, that it is simply the preference of Europeans that grew up in this particular religious tradition and that there is no reason to expect that democracy will spread to other parts of the world.

The alternative view, to which I ascribe, is that democracy in a certain sense is like the scientific method. The scientific method was invented by Francis Bacon and René Descartes and other thinkers in Europe four or five centuries ago. Once discovered, it became, in a certain sense, a universal possession and the scientific method does not vary in Japan or in Europe or in Africa or wherever it may be found. You can make a similar argument about the principles about modern democracy, and certainly about the principles of modern market economies; that although it has cultural roots in the West, it has universal applicability. That applicability is one that occurs as a result of a certain kind of complex historical process that starts with the process of technological change.

I am a Marxist-Hegelian in the sense that I believe that there is such a thing as "History" with a capital 'h'; historical evolution of human societies over time in a kind of universal process. The reason that that happens at the base has to do with modern science and technology. Modern science and technology proceeds in one direction. It does not go in cycles. You do not reinvent the same inventions over and over again. As long as modern science progresses in one direction, it is going to present a horizon of economic production possibilities that make the process of economic modernization a coherent thing.

It happened the same way in Korea as it happened in Japan, Germany,

England and the U.S. That process of economic modernization goes through certain well understood stages and produces certain kinds of socio-economic transformations that tend to make the convergence of societies greater as development occurs. That is the reason we are sitting in a room like this with everybody dressed in business suits, running institutions that are not that different here in Korea than they are in the United States or in Japan or in Western Europe. It is ultimately technology and the economic homogenization that that technology engenders that guarantees that modernizing societies will look increasingly similar on an economic level.

The next stage of this modernization process affects politics. Technology affects the economy, and with higher levels of economic development you get an increasing tendency to create democratic political institutions. Generally speaking, the cut-off point for having a successful, relatively stable democracy is approximately US\$ 6'000 in GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, a threshold that Korea crossed sometime in the 1980s. It is not therefore an accident that Korea democratized, more or less, in 1987.

I am a political scientist, and unlike economists and natural scientists we feel somewhat bad because our science does not actually produce a lot of universal laws. But one of the few universal correlations, if not laws, that political science has been able to come up with is the correlation between economic development and stable democracy; that if you look around the world, the most developed societies tend also to be democracies. You see throughout Asia pressure for increasing democratic participation as per capita incomes rise and as societies adopt modern technology and the higher levels of education that are needed to sustain that technology; they develop property rights and an interest in the protection of those property rights. So we have technology that influences economics that in turn influences the nature of politics. This is largely invariant no matter what part of the world you go to.

The final aspect of modernization has to do with culture. In a sense this fourth element, at the extreme end of this development machine, is the one that is the least affected and where convergence is weakest. I do not for a minute believe that Davos Man is going to become the universal cultural archetype

that will govern all societies in the future. I think that cultural differences are persistent and strong. I do not think that they necessarily determine the nature of politics, as Lee Kwan Yu tried to argue when he was promoting his thesis about Asian values.

But I do think that every society has different ways of approaching cultural aspects of everyday life relating to family and gender relations, as well as other social relations in which different societies are embedded. Those aspects of culture are not going to disappear and in many ways will prove remarkably durable. What happens in a modernizing society is not that culture disappears but that the scope of cultural differences narrow in a certain sense and that culture is put into a box where it is disconnected from political life. This is what we mean by the secularism of modern politics; that in a modern society religion, for example, does not disappear. It has not disappeared in any modern society. But there is an agreement among the participants in that society not to let religious values determine the structure of political or economic institutions, as they once did in the Christian West.

People can have cultural views, they can participate in religion, they can have a spiritual life, but they have to do it in the sphere of their private lives and not as a matter of politics. That is the final cultural characterization of a modern society, that it has a secular political order in which there is an agreement to keep these deep, fundamental cultural values out of politics and to enjoy them in a completely different sphere. So there is not convergence, but there is at least convergence on the principle of secularization.

I have now described this mechanism that leads from technological change to economic convergence to political democracy to a certain form of secular politics. The question is whether this model will hold up across all the different cultural groups that Huntington describes in his clash of civilizations? Are there parts of the world which, for cultural reasons, are more resistant to this process of modernization than others? Let me just take you on a brief tour around the world. Let us begin with this part of the world, Asia.

I do not believe that there are any fundamental cultural values or norms in Asia that will prevent this modernization scenario from playing out. In many ways your own country, Korea, is the best example of that. It has gone through a process of extremely rapid economic modernization. Every time I visit Korea, people worry and complain about the nature of Korean politics. But I believe that the democratic institutions that have been created here and their degree of success is quite remarkable, given the relative youthfulness of democracy in Korea. You have really done an extraordinarily good job. On a cultural level, no one would ever confuse a Korean for a Japanese, Chinese or American. But in a sense, there has been the same kind of willingness to put culture to one side and to adopt the necessary institutions of a modern society in order to go ahead and enjoy the benefits of a higher standard of living and modern technology, to compete in the global economy, and so forth.

I really do not believe, despite what Mahatir Mohammed and Lee Kwan Yu have argued, that there is any other Asian society that will ultimately resist this process of modernization. Asian values were put forward by various politicians in Asia as an excuse for justifying their own form of authoritarian government. But when China reaches the same level of per-capita GDP that Korea enjoyed in the 1980s, I think it is going to feel exactly the same pressures for political democracy that Korea, Taiwan, Japan, or any of the earlier developers felt. That applies to Singapore as well.

In fact Asia had certain cultural advantages in this modernization process. Religion and culture in Asia were tolerant in a way that they were not in any of the great monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity or Judaism. There has always been an ease in the mixing of religious traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, Shinto and Daoism in this part of the world.

Africa's problems have very much to do with very bad government and the lack of any kind of fundamental political stability. I do not think there are any fundamental, cultural obstacles to modernization in that part of the world.

If you go to the former Soviet Union and other former socialist countries, the problem they have with modernization, transition to democracy and market



economy is really not a cultural one. It is a matter of bad execution and the absence of certain cultural habits that enable markets and democracy to work effectively. But it is not a cultural resistance to the end point of democracy and markets. Most people, and especially younger people, in that part of the world would affirm that that is exactly where they would like to end up. They may not be able to achieve it, but certainly the objective is very clear.

Latin America, of course, is part of a European Christian cultural community to begin with, so I think the resistance to modernization in that part of the world is a very complex mixture of poor institutions, bad policies and certain other kinds of cultural habits that prevent the rapid transition to modernity of the sort seen in Asia. But it must be said that there are success stories like Chile and hopefully Mexico, where that transition will occur.

That brings us to the Islamic world, where I think you can make the strongest argument that there are, in fact, cultural conditions that have been relatively more resistant to modernization than in the other areas. This is one of the other reasons that I have always thought that Huntington's clash of civilizations paradigm tends to apply more to the Middle East and the Muslim world more broadly than to any other cultural group.

The Islamic world, though very sophisticated as commercial societies and certainly having extraordinarily rich cultural backgrounds, has had difficulties in implementing some of the basic institutions of modern societies. Apart from Turkey, there has not been a successful liberal democracy in the Islamic world. The Islamic countries that have modernized are, in a way, the ones furthest away from the Arab heartland, that is to say countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where the form of Islam practiced is somewhat different.

Most importantly, the Islamic world is the only major cultural area that has over the past couple of generations repeatedly produced people like Ayatollah Khomeini, the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden or the Taliban, who are not just critical of aspects of Western policy, but in a certain sense reject the whole process of modernization lock, stock and barrel. The

Taliban do not want modern, Western consumerism. If you look around the world, the strongest driving force of modernization in virtually every poor country is poor people's desire to own a television set, a washing machine, to have a place of their own, to have a little bit of property. Here you have a religious group in the Middle East that simply argues that consumerism itself is a sign of decadence and corruption.

Where does this resistance come from? How fundamental is it? What is its future? In a sense, that is the chief issue. The ideological issue is the single most important distinguishing characteristic of this form of radical Islam that makes it particularly problematic in world politics. The basic element of that ideological difference is the difference over secularism. All of those radical Islamic groups I just mentioned reject the principle of secular government. Their major political objective is to create Islamic societies in which religion dictates the shape of politics. They do not, by any means, represent a majority of the Muslim world. There are plenty of people in the Muslim world that are perfectly happy with modernization, that want secular societies, that accept the basic principles of modernization that I laid out, that want democracy, that want markets. But there is this minority that rejects it.

What are the causes of this? This is a point at which I would have to plead ignorance because it is not an area where I have great expertise. My suspicion is that there is not something deep and fundamental about Islam as a religion that produces this outcome. I say that by looking back at past history. If you look at the centuries of Ottoman rule, for example, in the Middle East, you had actually an empire that was remarkably tolerant. The Ottomans introduced the Millet system in which local communities of Christians or Jews were allowed to keep their own religious practices and traditions. You did not have this kind of strict interpretation based on the Quran that was intolerant of other different heterodox traditions as you do among modern Islamic radicals. All of this tells me that Islam is a complex cultural tradition just like Hinduism, Christianity or Confucianism that can actually act as a support for a broad variety of different types of political systems. There is nothing deeply anti-modern about Islam as a religion.

There is, however, a problem with the modern interpretations of Islam that

have emerged over the past several decades that have produced this kind of Islamic radicalism. It is fed by the so-called deep causes, by the poverty and alienation and political stagnation of many countries, particularly in the Arab world. When mixed with religion, it forms the core of the kind of Islamic radicalism that you see. I have argued in the Davos issue of Newsweek in a more comprehensive way that radical Islamism is a form of fascism. It is an appeal to earlier traditions that are very intolerant, that combine older traditions with modern political organization and, in a way, respond to the same kind of alienation and displacement of traditional communities that European fascism did at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

What will happen in the future and what will we do about it? First of all, this is not the wave of the future. Modernization is a juggernaut that will continue. In a way, this kind of Islamic radicalism has emerged in response to the very threat that the appeal of modernization has to people in that region. Ultimately, that battle is one they cannot win. In the shorter run, there are some hopeful signs. One sign is the progress of the military campaign in Afghanistan. It is unfortunately the case that in world politics, legitimacy frequently follows power. The Nazis were not delegitimated because their ideas were just so terribly bad. They were delegitimated because the Allies crushed Germany, occupied its territory and basically ended that regime.

The victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan will have a similar effect on the perceived legitimacy of this kind of Islamic radicalism. People like winners. As long as Osama bin Laden looked like he was a winner, he could attract a lot of support in the Muslim world. But now that he looks like a loser, I think that is going to undercut his appeal. Therefore, the military action was a very important one that will have ideological repercussions. We will have to wait and see because I do not think this war is over yet. There could be further terrorist acts and there could be other phases of the drama. But the military campaign was a basic turning point.

The more important developments, however, are ones that have to occur within the Islamic world itself. Muslim people need to come to grips with this phenomenon in their midst, this kind of Islamic radicalism. It is certainly not characteristic of a majority of Muslims. I think that in a certain sense the

present crisis has been an opportunity for many Muslims to confront the kind of Islam they want. There tends to be initially a circling of wagons and a defense of Islam as a religion. But there is a deeper problem that is posed by this very anti-modern strain in Islam. It is really only Muslims that can address this problem. This is a dialogue that has to occur among Muslims themselves.

There is some ground for that dialogue already to start with. We have a lot of evidence that this kind of radical Islam is appealing only in the abstract. It is not appealing to anybody that has actually had to live in a fundamentalist theocracy. We now have two cases of this: Iran and Afghanistan. In each, a group has come to power that imposed this kind of strict Islamic order. As far as anyone can tell, people hate living in these kinds of societies. Iran is a country where 70% of the population are under the age of 30. As far as anyone can tell, none of these younger people want to live in an Islamic republic. I would suspect that Iran may be the country that leads the Islamic world out of this kind of Islamic radicalism, just as it was Ayatollah Khomeini that led them into it in 1979.

You saw the same thing in Afghanistan. All these people flying kites and playing soccer and digging up their TVs that the Taliban had buried, made it very clear that nobody likes living in the Afghanistan of the Taliban. This should also have a salutary effect for other Muslims contemplating what kind of society they want in the future. Pakistan is a country that has been forced by circumstances, by Sept. 11, and by their confrontation over the past month with India, to finally confront the problem of radical Islam within their own society. As far as I can tell, General Musharraf has been taking the right decisions in finally cracking down on these groups and finally saying to his fellow Pakistanis that this form of radical Islam is no longer tolerable. I think this is a process that may occur in other Muslim countries as well.

Let me talk a little about the future and some of the other implications of Sept. 11 that are, in a way, more immediate. Whatever you might think about the Muslim world, I remain fairly optimistic in the long run. There is no fundamental obstacle to a more liberal form of Islam. There are no insuperable long-term cultural barriers, but it is a process that will require

dialogue within the Muslim community. It is not something that will happen over night.

Let me shift a little bit toward some other changes in world politics that are implied by the events of Sept. 11. In terms of globalization, none of this will slow down the mental process of globalization. Still, it is going to put a lot of sand in the gears of the globalization machine. Osama bin Laden has imposed, in effect, a transaction tax on every transaction that takes place in the global economy because the global economy involves the shipment of goods, people and services across international borders. With a security dimension to those transfers of which we are all now aware, it is inevitable that every one of them—every container, every ship, every airplane that comes through—is going to have to be scrutinized at a higher level than prior to Sept. 11. It is not going to stop globalization but the transaction cost of operating a global economy will be higher. I am sure all of you who have traveled by airplane since Sept. 11 see my point.

The second implication has to do with what has been called the revolution in military affairs as demonstrated by the American operations in Afghanistan. I take some satisfaction in how wrong all of the pundits were in the beginning of the Afghan War. Back in early October, when the American campaign began, a lot of journalists and commentators and talking heads were saying that the Afghans defeated the British and they defeated the Soviets and there is no way the Americans are going to avoid being bogged down in a quagmire. Yet the United States was able to change the regime in Afghanistan in a period of less than three months with only one combat casualty. They were able to do that by effectively working with local allies.

In many ways, those of us in Washington that had been following the revolution in military affairs are only now beginning to appreciate that the revolution has finally arrived. It used to be the case that air power could not be used against tactical targets, that is to say a target that is, say, 100 metres in front of your front line. It had to be used against strategic targets that were 50km to 100km behind the front. What has changed in the Afghan War is the maturing of a series of technologies that allow a B-52 or a B-2 operating from Missouri or Diego Garcia, flying at 10'000 metres over a battle field, to drop a

munition on the front line with the kind of precision that allows it to target one house rather than the house next to it.

This is a military capability that has simply never existed before in modern warfare. It has a number of implications for the balance of power because the United States is the only country in the world that has the capability of deploying this kind of military power. I used to work at the RAND Corporation. It was a think tank for the Defense Department and I did a lot of studies about the balance of power in the Korean Peninsula. The assessment of the outcomes of any conventional scenario changes due to these changes in military capability. It also means that the United States is going to have opportunities for intervention. It will not face the same kind of constraints as seen ever since Vietnam.

Which brings me to the final question. What is phase two of the American campaign and what happens after the defeat of the Taliban? As all of you are aware, there has been a great deal of discussion in Washington over what to do about Iraq. One thing that Sept. 11 demonstrated is that even if there is no provable connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, the simple existence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a dictator like Saddam Hussein is a very unsafe situation. A lot of people, myself included, have decided that in many ways this is not a risk that the United States can safely take.

The major military constraints to unseating Saddam Hussein after Afghanistan have largely been prudential ones about military feasibility. Obviously the United States cannot build up a force of half a million men in the Persian Gulf and attack Iraq as it did in 1991. On the other hand, one of the possible implications of the war in Afghanistan is to make that kind of military operation feasible at a much lower level of effort. It depends on a lot of very complex judgments about the fragility of Saddam Hussein's regime and the kind of internal support that you would get if you were to oppose him.

But clearly, over the next year, that is going to be the chief issue that will be debated and planned for in Washington. Which means, unfortunately, that world politics is not going to go back to normal, the way it was prior to Sept.

11, but that, in fact, there is going to be a continuing struggle. If the problem is this form of Islamic radicalism combined with weapons of mass destruction, the issue is yet to be solved.

Thank you very much for your attention.

## Questions & Answers

**Q:** I have two questions that are kind of related. You mentioned modernization has caused people to follow more similar patterns. But I do not believe that we are more similar. Do you believe modernization is going to eventually make people more similar to each other culturally? Secondly, I believe that different regions are experiencing different evolutionary stages. It takes evolution to get them all together. Do you believe that modernization is going to make that evolution turn into a revolution, and take place much faster than what has been the case historically?

**A:** Clearly my answer would be no. We will engage in similar activities. Our institutions will look similar on a large scale. But many of the personal values that we carry into those institutions will be different. Even some of the institutions themselves will vary in important ways.

For example, Asia has certain unique capitalist institutions—the *chaebol* in Korea, the Japanese *keiretsu*—which I think are shaped by certain kinds of cultural values. I do not expect all of those to simply disappear and be replaced by a single Western model. Certainly if you get into more personal kinds of values relating to family, marriage, relations between the sexes and these sorts of things, the likelihood that there will be an ultimate convergence is fairly small. It is not desirable either. I do not think that anybody wants that kind of convergence.

As to whether things have been speeded up, clearly there has been a good kind of speeding up in the sense that you now have countries like all of the fast developers in East Asia that have been able to carry out the whole process of modernization with extraordinary rapidity. Korea did in 40 years what took Britain and Germany a good 100 or 150 years to accomplish. The bad side of it is that modern communication technology, in a certain sense, provides everybody with an awareness of what modernization is without the

ability to actually achieve it. So the world has been modernized and speeded up but people still live in poverty and do not really have a way of getting out of it. That is where a lot of the resentment to that process comes from.

**Q:** As far as I understand your argument, you believe that the globalization process does not have any political tendencies. What I mean is, many people believe that Sept. 11 is a direct consequence of the globalization process which affects many people who are not able to benefit from the process. There are many discussions and views that we will have to make some effort to address this problem to harmonize the globalization process. But do you believe the globalization process is not a politically motivated process, that it is just a neutral process, like a natural order?

**A:** I would never argue that globalization is not a political process. It involves certain kind of value choices. I think that globalization is ultimately a progressive force. It is an avenue for countries to get out of poverty. It is also ultimately the basis for long term political democracy. The trouble is that that is not an automatically guaranteed result, and there are certain negative consequences of globalization as well. So globalization by itself is not enough.

You need to think of the experience of the 1990s, which showed that what you need is not simply free markets and the economic side of globalization. You need institutions, politics and good government. Without those, economic globalization can actually lead people to be worse off. This has obviously produced a backlash. I am reluctant to lump Osama bin Laden into the same pool as Western trade unionists and environmentalists and other kind of globalization protesters. There are people who are genuinely negatively impacted by globalization, but most of them do not blow up skyscrapers. There is an additional religious element to the mix that helps explain that kind of behavior.

You are right that we need to think seriously about the way that globalization is implemented. There is a kind of careless globalization that was practiced particularly in Washington in the early 1990s that actually led to a lot of negative consequences.

**Q:** You said that events of Sept. 11 have thrown sand in the machine of modernization because of the economic costs of greater security. What about



the effect on civil liberties, the extent to which the trend towards greater human rights for individuals in terms of liberty of the individual may be increasingly circumscribed by the need for protection against terrorism? How is the debate on that going in Washington?

**A:** Actually, the real world impact on civil liberties is probably going to be a lot less than people have been fearing. The whole reason the Bush Administration pushed for military tribunals is that they simply did not want to reenact the O. J. Simpson trial with Osama bin Laden in an American courtroom. That is the chief nightmare that led them to make that decision. The trials of Nazi war criminals was a military tribunal, and nobody objected to the legitimacy of putting Hermann Goering on trial in that kind of a setting.

What we have seen already with Moussaoui, the first would-be terrorist that was indicted, and now with John Walker just yesterday, is in fact that the Bush Administration has been relatively reluctant to turn to the tribunals. We will have to see, but the threat to civil liberties may be more modest than it might appear because the Bush Administration is more concerned with preparing the ground for certain extreme contingencies, like the actual capture of Osama bin Laden and how to try him, rather than seeing this as a routine way of processing ordinary terrorists.

**Q:** I would like to ask one question. It is related to the thesis of Professor Huntington. He stated that many societies have, or remain, unchanged in the process of modernization. In other words, there is an Italian writer who said many years ago, "Everything must change. For everything remains the same."

**A:** There is a profound sense in which that is true, that everything changes with modernization. When you look at many apparently modernized societies and you scratch a little bit below the surface—particularly when you get out of a room like this where you have elites that are quite fully modernized—and you go down a few levels socially, you will find that what looks like a modern city is actually a displaced village; that, in fact, all the relations that existed in the village have been created in an urban slum neighborhood and that really not that much is different from the way these people interacted with each other 50 or 100 years ago before the modernization process began. That is really true. The more you look at

modernizing societies, the more you see the persistence of these kind of habits.

But that's not a terrible thing. In regard to values, what has happened in the United States and the West is not a great thing. My last book, "The Great Disruption", dealt with the breakdown of the family, the breakdown of trust, the rise in crime rates, a lot of social pathologies and this extreme individualism that evolved in the United States as a result of the transition to what we now call a post-industrial or information society. A lot of these developments are negative. It's not something that I would want to see replicated in other parts of the world. Many so-called traditional societies actually have their values better arranged than the United States does, in terms of personal values.

**Q:** Why did the Almighty God let terror happen? Why did God not prevent it from happening? Will God or mankind be able to resolve and prevent the clashes of civilization and world order in your view. Also, don't you think the Oriental civilization has helped, and will continue to help, the improvement of American civilization and world order?

**A:** Why did God allow Sept. 11 to happen? I do not know. I guess you really have to ask Him. It is a question that all religions have faced, this question of justifying God in the presence of palpable evil, and I do not mean to be glib in saying that. I think it is a very profound question and I do not know what the answer to that is. I am not sure whether God will prevent this in the future. But I do think that in the long run, institutions and societies will get better over time.

**Q:** Regarding your thesis about the end of history, I would like to know what, in your opinion, is the next step in China, from the political point of view? In other words, I would like to know if, in your opinion, genuine democracy is an option for China.

**A:** I am sure a lot of you who are closer to China than I am can probably answer this question better. My feeling about China has always been that with increasing levels of education, the creation of a complex civil society and all the other things that result from modernization, you will get demands

for greater political participation. I just find it very hard to see how you can rule a country of 1.2 billion people in a hierarchical, centralized manner. In fact, in China you are already seeing a kind of de facto federalism and a seepage of power from the center to different parts of Chinese society. The trouble is that the path from getting from here to a more democratic China is not necessarily a smooth one. It could go through a lot of political turmoil as the Old Guard gives up power. I would not want to make any near term predictions on that.

**Q:** Traditionally, going back over the past few centuries, it seems to me that global conflicts have been between nation states. Global conflict today seems to be between individuals or non-state actors. Firstly, how do you address that in your military approach? And, secondly, how do you then deal with the people once you have defeated them or been defeated by them? Do you use purely military or military and legal approaches when dealing with those individuals?

**A:** Nation states are actually still pretty important. We used to think that Osama bin Laden represented a true sub-national terrorist group that did not enjoy state support. The more we have learned about Afghanistan indicates that, in fact, it was not just that Afghanistan tolerated him. He had basically taken over Afghanistan and was able to use the resources of that failed state as a base for his operations. Absent his ability to, in effect, take over a country like that, he would have been much less effective.

I didn't at all mean to say that the methods, particularly at this point forward, have to be military ones. Clearly now you are dealing with a more sub-national set of actors. In fact, Europe is probably the chief haven now for a lot of al-Qaeda terrorists. Obviously you are going to use legal methods rather than military methods to deal with that. That is a lot of police work and intelligence sharing, and so forth.

**Q:** In terms of the Islamic world and how to deal with it in its evolution, the West has been somewhat ambivalent. In the past, the West has mainly supported theocratic governments and has been quite critical of secular governments like Syria and Iraq. But most importantly, if one wants to have better relations with the Islamic world and to lessen resentment, lessen the

chances and causes of terrorism, which we all condemn, then there are a number of areas, like the Middle East, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Bosnia, where the West has to come to grips with some kind of equitable solution. Otherwise, even though everyone hopes for liberal democracy, these causes of tension will remain.

**A:** I did not mean to brush over any of those issues. Clearly the Muslim world has a lot of quarrels with the way that America has handled its policy. In terms of a country like Saudi Arabia, which I think probably was what you were referring to when you said that the U.S. has supported religious governments and not secular ones like Syria and Iraq, I think you are right. I also think that Sept. 11 should be an occasion for an important American re-thinking of its relationship with Saudi Arabia because, in fact, American policy makers, as a result of self-interest and other factors—primarily self-interest in oil—have convinced themselves that Saudi Arabia is in fact a so-called moderate Arab state and an ally and so forth. If you look back at the history of the spread of this kind of Islamic radicalism, Saudi Arabia is a large part of the problem and not part of the solution. Therefore, that close relationship needs to be reconsidered.

In general, it is always possible to improve American policy on a whole variety of fronts. I am a little bit skeptical that there is much the United States could have done in terms of that kind of policy adjustment that would have satisfied somebody like Osama bin Laden.

For example, the United States came very close in the last year of the Clinton Administration to getting a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. I used to work on the peace process when I was at the State Department in the 1980s, and the kind of concessions that Barak was willing to make on Jerusalem were just absolutely astonishing. I am not even sure he could have gotten them approved by the Knesset had he put the peace treaty up for a vote.

But supposing that you had an agreement and you had a final settlement that created a Palestinian state, would Osama bin Laden then have turned around and said, “OK. That satisfies my agenda. I’m not going to blow up any more American facilities?” I don’t think so. I think that his grievances go way beyond particular American positions. Short of the United States abandoning Israel and pulling out of the Gulf entirely, I am not convinced that

there are many policy adjustments that would have seriously undermined that particular form of radicalism. Clearly there are things that we can do that will satisfy other, less radical friends and other groups in the Muslim world.

**Q:** Let me follow up on the first question. Let me begin by noting that, as of now, all the rich industrialized countries are Western countries and no non-Western countries belong to this group. On the part of the non-Western, developing, transition countries, one can say that their developmental efforts involve the struggle to overcome a clash of cultures, in the sense of giving up their own local culture in acceptance of Western culture. I think that is basically what is meant by the acceptance of global standards. We talk about global standards, but they are actually Western standards that we call global standards.

Let us, for example, reflect on the Asian crisis that we Koreans experienced. That crisis, in a fundamental sense, can be said to be attributable to the prevalence of local culture over the global, Western culture. We have, in some sense, overcome that crisis by accepting Western standards and giving up Korean standards. All these standards are basically cultural phenomena.

It appears that right now, the Japanese are engaged in the same battle between local Japanese culture and Western culture. If Japanese culture prevails, I think their economy will continue to stagnate. If they are willing to give up their culture—by talking about Japanese culture here I am talking about the gerontocracy, the respect for seniority, the emphasis on the value of harmony and consensus—then they may not be able to overcome the current economic crisis.

So in that sense, if the non-Western countries succeed with their developmental effort and process, maybe they have to give up their cultures in a steady and continuous way? In the end, maybe all prosperous countries will end up under the dominance of Western culture? If they do not, they might remain outside the circle of rich countries. What would you say to that? And, also, please give us your assessment about the current excitement over the long-term future of China. What do you think China's future will be like, say, 20 years from now?

**A:** Yes, globalizing does require some giving up of tradition. Particularly

in the sphere of economic institutions, there is clearly a convergence going on. You are right that the Asian financial crisis reflects the weaknesses in certain Asian economic practices like the *keiretsu*, *chaebol*, and other institutions you referred to. You are right that one of the consequences of the crisis has been to reduce the gap between Asian and Western institutions. That is what I was referring to before, that this process of modernization really does force a convergence over time, particularly in the sphere of the economy.

The question is, however, will that ever lead to a pure homogenization of the whole world and the giving up of all values across the board. I do not think that that is likely to happen for a couple of reasons. First of all, I believe there are a couple ways that one can create modern institutions. The range of variance is not as great as we used to think, but there are some. Lean manufacturing has been imported from Japan into the United States and used very effectively in the American automobile industry as an alternative form of factory organization. I do not think that there will be this complete homogenization. Particularly in the sphere of personal life, as I indicated, I think there will be a lot of cultural variation, particularly in terms of religion.

You asked about the long-term future of China. I don't know. It just seems to me that the way to think about it is not by making these straight line economic predictions but rather by looking at politics. When you start looking at politics, it becomes very difficult to make predictions.

**Q:** When the attacks occurred on Sept. 11, a majority of the administration officials were hawkish and did not want to waste any time building alliances. They just wanted to go after everyone, including Saddam Hussein. I thought, quite frankly, that many of them has lost their minds due to their anger. But having seen how the war evolved and, as you described, the military technology, I see why even rational minds could think in those terms. It was fortunate that the relatively young and inexperienced president relied on the minority voice of Colin Powell. The voice of caution prevailed in the end.

But this still raises a question. In the Orient, we distinguish between cleverness and wisdom. I believe that people are getting more clever. But I do not see a lot of advancement in wisdom over the last thousands of years. Do you see any?

**A:** I am not sure that there was ever a strong tendency within the Bush Administration to just run off and do things unilaterally. I think there was unilateralism in the way we handled the Kyoto Protocol and a number of other things. But I think that that can be a bit overstated. The United States, just like any other country, finds that in order to do things effectively it has to work with friends and allies. The big issue is going to be how to handle Iraq, because if the United States moves militarily there, it will lose many friends.

We can only hope that politicians use this new power wisely. I can see why a lot of people around the world are nervous by the development of these new military capabilities, because they really are quite unprecedented. But on the whole, American hegemony is different from the hegemony of past empires. People have less reason to worry.

**Q:** According to your great book, “The End of History”, all kinds of big confrontations between communism and capitalism have disappeared after the collapse of communism. You define it as a win for capitalism. But recently, another big confrontation, Sept. 11, happened to the United States, the center of capitalism. How can we make sense of Sept. 11 if we try to understand it in terms of your “End of History” theory?

**A:** As I said, the only sense you can make of Sept. 11 was that this, in a certain way, was a confirmation of the end of history. Modernization is this extremely powerful force in the world and everybody has to contend with it. There are a few people like Osama bin Laden that do not want any part of it. Most people want at least the economic part. He did not want any part of it. The extremeness of his reaction was a demonstration of how vivid the threat is of this kind of Western style modernization.

**Q:** I know that you are a very close observer of Japan and East Asia as a whole. The pessimism on Japan is fairly universal, which is very contrasting to the universal optimism that existed in the ‘80s. What went wrong in Japan? Compared to Japan, the United States in the ‘80s was plagued by twin deficits and pessimism. But the U.S. economy then did well in the ‘90s. So what went right there? Does this have to do with adaptability to the changing global environment? How do you react and explain this?

**A:** My view on Japan is fairly simple. The basic problem in Japan is a political one. The conservative interest in the LDP captured the Finance Ministry and the economic decision making ministry and it has such a powerful lock on economic policy that no Japanese politician has been able to break it. Koizumi had a chance of doing it, but it would involve splitting the LDP and provoking a really big political showdown. Until that happens, I do not really see the prospects for fundamental change taking place there.

I think it is just entrenched interests and the fact that they never felt themselves to be in a crisis. Korea, in a way, was fortunate that there was a very extreme crisis in 1997 and 1998 that gave the political leadership good grounds for taking fairly dramatic economic reform measures. To this day, most Japanese do not believe that they are in a crisis to begin with.

In the United States, the success is somewhat mysterious. Institutions are flexible and the convergence of institutions and technology led to this remarkable performance in the 1990s. But it is so easy to get overconfident about your success in one decade and think that it will carry over into the next. I would not say that there is some deep reason for that happening. I think we suddenly got lucky.