


IGE/삼성전자

Business Global Forum 2005

미국의 힘은 얼마나 강하며, 중국의 부상은 어떻게 보아야 하나?



Measuring American Power in Today's Complex World

Paul Kennedy

China "Rising": What Lessons for Today from the Past?

Bernard K. Gordon

IGE/삼성전자

Business Global Forum 2005

미국의 힘은 얼마나 강하며, 중국의 부상은 어떻게 보아야 하나?

Measuring American Power in
Today's Complex World

Paul Kennedy

China "Rising":
What Lessons for Today from the Past?

Bernard K. Gordon

가

- 후원회원의 종류

-
-

- 법인 회원에 대한 서비스

-
-
-

5

가 가

- 개인 회원에 대한 서비스

-
- 가
-

- 후원회비는 관련세법에 따라 세금공제 가능

- 회원 가입 문의

- :

159

2505

- : 551-3334~7() 551-3339()

- E-mail: igenet@igenet.com

- <http://www.igenet.com>

머리말

1980 “ (The Rise and Fall of
Great Powers)” Yale
Paul Kennedy
가

/ 가, Bernard Gordon
19

가

Gordon

.

‘IGE/

Global Business Forum’

.

/

가

가

,

.

‘IGE/

Global Business Forum’

,

.

목 차

3



가?

7

Paul Kennedy

,

29

Bernard K. Gordon

English text

Measuring American Power in Today's Complex World

59

Paul Kennedy

China "Rising": What Lessons for Today from the Past?

77

Bernard K. Gordon

저자약력

Paul Kennedy

- 現 Yale大 .
- Oxford大 .
- ‘The Rising and Fall of the Great Powers’, ‘Preparing for Twenty-first Century’

Bernard K. Gordon

- 現 New Hampshire大 .
- New York大 卒, Chicago大 .
- Kyoto大, Kobe大, Singapore大 .
- ‘America’s Trade Follies: Turning Economic Leadership into Strategic Weakness’ .

가?*

Paul Kennedy

가

(Yale)

가

가

가

가

가

10

(soft power)

*

2005 10 13

‘IGE/

Global Business Forum’

(Rise and Fall of the Great Powers)
(Harvard)

, 'Bound to Lead'
(Joseph Nye) 가

1

가

가 가

20

4

75~80

11

5 ~6

(frigate) , ,

280

가

(Ronald Reagan)

14

9/11

가 가 . NATO가

19 ()

1

가 가

가 가

가

, 38,000

, 144,000

가

가

가

가

GDP가 가

가

가

200~300

가

(超)

가

가

가

가
 가
 가
 가
 가
 .
 22~25%
 .
 , 10~15
 .
 . (Bretton Woods)
 (World Bank), (International Monetary Fund),
 (Bank for International Settlement)

가
 가
 . (EU)
 . 가
 . (Chirac)
 (Tony Blair) 가
 .
 . 가
 . 가 가
 (WTO) 가 가
 ‘ , 가 . 2
 (European Trade Commission)가

(Microsoft)

6 5

(Bill Gates)

가

2

가

가

가?

가?

가

가

가

(euro) 가

2

가

4

가 가?

(Boeing) (Bechtel)

가

(Hartford)

가 (Bangalore)

(outsourcing) (Merrill Lynch),
(American Express),
(Mumbai)

3~4

가

12 (Goldman Sachs)

가 가

‘ (BRICs)’ 4

4

2050

1 . 2

가 50 가

가 1870~1880

1

가 4

가

가

가 “ 가

가

가 가 2,000 가

가 가 가

2 14 가 (George Bush)

가

가가

80%

(Business Week)

(Wall Street Journal)

(Paul Volcker)

(East Asian Wall Street Journal)

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

‘Bound to Lead’

가

가

가

가

CNN

(Marlboro

man),

10

(valley girl), MTV

가

(Breshnev)

가

가?

(neo-

conservatives)

(International Criminal Court)

(Kyoto Protocol),

(International Convention on the Rights of
Women and the Child)

가 .
35~45 (PEW)
가 .
가 .
가 SUV , 가 .
가 .
가 , UN .
가 .
가 .
가 .
가 1 .

.
,
가
. .
(Franklin Roosevelt) (JFK)
. .
, , ,
가
가
.
. .
,

질의·응답

■ (Financial Times)
(Francis
Fukuyama) 가
(hegemony)
가
가

가?

가

가?

가

,

.



1

가가

1

가?

230kg

가

,

가

.

450

1

가?

가

,

1

가 1

,

.

2

1

가

가

가

Oaks) 1944 (Bretton Woods) 1945 (Barton Oaks)

(對)

UN

가

가

가

가가

가 가

■ 가

3~4

(Iad Leutvack)

(Michael Reuben)

“ 가 가 .”
UN

3~4

5

(Rumsfeld)

(戰場)

가

(Challabi)

(George Washington)

가 (禁制)

가

가



가

가

가가

가?

2~3가

가?

, 가?



LA

가 .

가

“ . 가
(team player)가 .”

가

, 가 (National Security council)

가 4 , 가 2 , 3 , 가
11

가

가

가

가

2

가

가

가

가

가

가

(Osprey)

가

5~6

가가

가

가 가

(John Bolton)

“

” .

. , “

.

.

. 60

2~3

가

3

가 .”

가 (Gadafif)

가 . 가

6

.

,

,

. UN

.

.

. “

, “

.

.”

.
,
.



.
.

. 6 가

가 (가

), 가 . -

. .

(road map)

가 가?



6 가 (Winston Churchill) “

” , 6 ,

.
.

가

(package)

,

가

.

가

,

가

.

가

,

.

가

가

,

.

,

가

.

-

가

가

.

.

,

,

.

가

,

가

.

?*

Bernard K. Gordon

5

(10~20)
가

“

”

(University of

Chicago)

(Hans J. Morgenthau)

가

1952

(In Defense of the National Interest)’

1949

(Mao Tse

Tung)

3

가

가

*

2005 10 28

‘IGE/

Global Business Forum’

가 ...

가 가 ...

가 ...1)

50 “ 가 ‘ 가
(Politics Among Nations)’

가

I

가

1950

1960 1970

1) Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York, Knopf, 1952), p.205.

, ‘ , , ‘
 , ‘ , .
 가 가
 . 가
 , , , 20~30
 가 1 3
 가 , .
 가 가
 , “ .
 가 ” .
 . 가 가
 . 가 2
 , ,
 .
 가 가
 .
 가 가
 . 가

가 가 (가
). 가 2
, ,
,
. 2 ,
.
,
, 가 . ‘ (Pan
-Africanism)’, ‘ (Pan-Arabism)’, ‘ (Arab Nationalism)’
가? 가
가 ‘ 가’
. ‘ 가’
가 ,
‘ 가 ’ .
‘ 가 ’ ,
. ,
가 , ,
, ,
.
가 , ,
.
가 가 , ,
.
가
가 . ‘ ,

가 가
가

II

가 가

가

200

(,)
가
가 (Tonkin),
(Annam), (Cochinchina), (Cambodia), (Laos)

가

. ,
,

.
, ,

20

가 가 ‘ ’

가

(system)’

가

가

19 20

()

(Einstein)

(Freud),

(Gustav Mahler)

(Richard Wagener),

(Fredrich

Nietzsche)

(Marx Weber)

1

1

가 ‘ (revanchism)’ 가 .

(Hitler)

, 가

(Treaty of Versailles)

, ‘ ’

III

, 가

. 가 .

, 1933

, 가

. 가

가 , 가 .

가 가?

가 ‘ 가 ’

(Robert Zoellick)

4 가

2)

1933

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

1930

2) “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005, New York

가

2

가

(FDI)

FDI

2

(Lenove)

IBM

(Deng Xiaopin)

”

“

()

가

가

(非)

가

1920 1930

(Nazi)

가

2 3

가

(Nanchang)

(Kunming)

9
19

가

2~3

1

가 ,

가 가

가

가

가

가

(都農)

9~9.5%

(가)

EU,

가

(Snow)

가

가

가

(infrastructure)

IV

가

2~3

FDI

가

FDI

FDI가

2003 FDI

가
 (Richard Armitage)가 5
 “
 ”
 “
 ” 3)

가
 (ASEN Regional Forum)
 (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
 forum) 가

APEC 가 , 가
 (
)
 . 가 . ,
 가
 . 1/4

3) Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, 2 May 2005.

23% 26%


3

가

3

가

Global Shares of US Merchandise Exports in 2004; Total=\$807.5 Bn



Source: US Commerce Department, Census Bureau, Exhibit #13, FTD Final Revisions 2004

가

가

가

(Rumsfeld)

가

가

가

(China's Defense Academy)

가

가 가 가

,

가

“

”

가

가

질의·응답

가

가 430

가

15

. 가

가?

가?

가

가

가

가

EU

가

1, 2

가

가

. ,

.
가

,

. 가

가 가

, 5~10

가

.

가

가 ,

가

가

가

.

10

가

가

가

.

.

가

.

가 가

,

.



가

가



가

가

가

EU,

WTO

가

EU

가

가

가

가

WTO

WTO

가

WTO

EU

가

가

가

가

가

가

(system)

가

1930

가

가

가

가

13~14

“ ”

가
EU 가

가

가

1930

(integral nationalism)’

가

가

. A. G. Frank

‘The Reorient’

18

21

30~50

가?

가 가
, ,
(Northeast Passage Project)
가 가
가 가?
가 가
가 가



가

가

, 21

가

가

가

WTO

가

가

15

가

(Bill

Clinton)

가

가

가

가

가

. 64가 (degree of freedom) 가 8×8

.
40

‘ ’ ‘ (go)’ .

400 19×19

. 가

10 IBM 가

,
. .

,
가 .

.
가

. WTO
가 가
가
가 .

.
가 .

1971 (Kissinger)



가

가

(Condoleezza Rice)

, 6

(가

) 가 . 가

가 (Hill)

, 가 가

. ‘ (engagement)’

- 가 ,

가 .

- 가 ,

가 .

가 ,

가

, 가


가 .

가 .

가

,

.



‘US Military Government History in Korea’ Owen Latimoa가
‘The Situation in Asia’ ,

가?



가

가

가

가

가

가?



가

가

(Schroeder)

가

가

EC(EU)

EC

가

가

가

1957~1958

John Monet

Abnauer

“ ”

EU

EC

가

가

가

가

가

영문

Measuring American Power in Today 's
Complex World

China " Rising " :
What Lessons for Today from the Past?

Measuring American Power in Today's Complex World*

Paul Kennedy

It is a pleasure to be back, good to see you again chairman SaKong, and to again be addressing the Institute for Global Economics. It has been too long since I last talked with you, and I apologize for that. I also apologize that very shortly after some Q & A you will see me running for the door. Professors at Yale do not usually run, but if I have to catch my plane, I will be running very hard and fast.

My topic is the measuring of American's power in today's complex world. All of those words are chosen; I am trying to measure so I am doing comparative assessments and judgments. I am trying to look at American power in complicated form, and trying to refer it to today's complicated world. I don't have to tell intelligent people on the peninsula of Korea that today's world is complicated.

For the sake of simplicity and argument, I will divide my remarks into three sections or three aspects of power. My argument is that you cannot measure global power and influence on one single plane or by one single criterion. And I think I will try to be generous and give a boost to my opposite at Harvard University, Professor Joseph Nye, who about 10 years ago, when he wrote 'Bound to Lead', which was a criticism of my 'Rise and Fall of the Great Powers', suggested that there is other power besides military as he coined the phrase, "soft power". What I would like to do is take a brief look at the relative measure of

* Transcription of a speech given at the IGE/Samsung Electronics Global Business Forum on Thursday, October 13, 2005

American military power, economic technological power, and then cultural diplomatic ideological power. Professor Nye says it's like playing on three different chessboards.

When we look at the chessboard of military power and the military balance of power in the world today, I don't think anyone would dispute that the US is unequalled number one. It manifests in so many material a physical and visual ways. If you have had a visit by an American aircraft carrier in one of your harbors, you will see what I mean. These large nuclear powered aircraft carriers are 20 stories high and as long as four soccer pitches. They have 75-80 jet aircraft and displace 110,000 tons. They also have a crew (if you also count the crew of the aircraft and helicopters) of about 5-6,000 people. It is a small town traveling across the globe. The aircraft carriers are accompanied by a lot of escorting vehicles, frigates, destroyers, and submarines. If you looked at the cost of one American carrier group, it is about 28 billion dollars for one carrier group. That is equal to the defense budget of Italy. But it's not just one; there are 14 of them. The last one was properly named the USS Ronald Reagan. They are in different parts of the world including the Atlantic, Persian Gulf, China Sea, and the Mediterranean.

They have reach and command of the air as well in terms of putting up their fighters and bombers, as well as control and communications through satellites, and particular specialized aircraft, which can direct their fighter aircraft. They have a special long-service trained military. They have an extraordinarily sophisticated intelligence system. You may not think it's all that sophisticated because it did not detect 9/11, but that's because they were picking up so much intelligence, they could not work out what was the important stuff. They have a whole array of alliances in Europe, with NATO, in Central America, in Southeast Asia, with Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

So this is a very large global spanning military power, which has no equivalent perhaps anywhere else in history. Even the

Roman Empire was only a European-wide empire. Even though the British Empire in the 19th century was worldwide, it didn't have the cumulative power of the US today; the defense budget of Russia and France was equal to that of Great Britain. So you would say that it is unequaled, and on this chessboard it is number one.

However, we cannot stop here. There are one or two things going on that worries even the ultra conservative American supreme nationalists and the US military people I talk to. First, there is an increasing mismatch between American commitments overseas and the forces, especially ground forces, to carry those out. This is what I call imperial overstretch. This is not really a problem for the US Navy or submarine force. At the moment the US submarine force is very bored and very worried because they do not have a big enemy like the Red Navy. But for the US Army and Marines, there is deep anxiety. At the last count, there were 368,000 American service men and women in 120 countries. Some of those are small like Marine Corps detachments protecting an embassy, or advising against drug trade in Columbia. However, there are very substantial deployments here in Korea, some in Japan, 38,000 still in Germany, 144,000 in Iraq, in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Haiti and the Philippines. And if you talk to the American military commanders, especially the Army, they are overstretched; they are not finding enough reserves and National Guard. So there is a gap, even for the largest power, between its personnel resources and its political commitments. And when a gap like that opens up, it is dangerous.

Second, even the military strategic chessboard is becoming affected by the rise of Asia. I chiefly talk about this rise in an economic sense, but those who study the military dimension, point to the fact that as China and India's overall GDP rises, the amount of money they're putting into their defense forces is increasing quite fast. This doesn't mean that they are beginning to launch aircraft carriers like those of the US, but they are building very significant, what we call sea denial capacities; they are going

to deny the capacity of the US Navy to come close to the shores of Asia with medium-range Intercontinental ballistic missiles, and sea-skimming missiles that will reach 2-300 miles out, undetectable by radar, and with ultra quiet diesel engine submarines. So now there are very few US Admirals that want to get close to the Chinese mainland; they are being denied--pushed further away. This is especially significant for Taiwan, but it is also significant for Korea.

Third, the larger and more powerful and formal visual American might is; the bigger the aircraft carriers and the larger the number of troop carriers, the more that America's enemies are driven towards a-symmetrical warfare. You don't fight America head to head, it is not like Helm's Navy fighting the British Navy in the North Sea, you fight a-symmetrically. You go after American soft targets: embassies, businessmen, commercial aircraft, and tourists. You use terrorist networks and drugs; this is how you hurt America, because you cannot do so in conventional military form

The fourth area that puts a bit of a question mark over America's unequalled and omnipotent military power is the great surge of conflicts in the world which are not state or government conflicts, they are civil wars, collapsed states, societies that are broken down and calling for help. In Western Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the American Military doesn't like to intervene in those kinds of wars, they like nice big wars where they can send their tanks in; they cannot send tanks into Sierra Leone. You need low-scale low-intensity fighting. It is messy and it doesn't provide quick results.

So in conclusion, even on the chessboard of the American military power; when we measure it against the tasks it faces, there are limitations.

Moving from the military to the economic and technological chessboard, I think we would see an even more mixed picture. I

forgot to mention that this year's pentagon budget, the budget for the US armed forces, will be equal in total to all of the defense budgets of all the other countries of the world. If you took the defense budgets of Japan, China, Russia, Britain, Italy, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and put them all together, it would not total the pentagon's defense budget. That's why people jump to the conclusion that militarily, the US is unequaled. As I have said, however, there are some weaknesses.

I move now to the economic dimension where we see a different balance. We would admit immediately that the US as a single nation is still the largest economy in the world. What percentage of total world product it has depends upon the forms of measuring. Lets say it has 22-25% of total world product. It has the lead in so many high technologies that it is the center of the global capital markets. It has the top 10-15 research universities and business schools. There is a very active and aggressive American business culture. It is a key actor in international financial organizations like the Bretton Woods Organization, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Bank for International Settlements.

Once again, we cannot stop here. We must look at some other indicators that show the US is not supreme on this chessboard. First, there is the size of the European Union. Politically, we know the European Union is still divided with different visions on how integrated it becomes, and Mr. Chirac and Mr. Tony Blair simply do not agree with each other on a number of issues, that's true. There is a debate on how far you expound the European Union. But taken as a single commercial block, it is now quite a bit larger than the US itself. And there it acts as a unitary way; you might quarrel with the politics, but you do not quarrel with your position towards World Trade Organization and trade disputes. You can see Europe using its "heft", or its weight. Mr. Bill Gates discovered this two years ago when the European Trade Commission put a fine of 650 million dollars on Microsoft for illegal trading on sales in Europe, and even Microsoft had to

go with its cap in its hand to Brussels and pay the fine. That's a different world than that of president Eisenhower's.

Two years ago the US administration under pressure from some senators and congressmen in whose constituencies there were steel manufacturing, put illegal tariffs on steel imports into the US. Brazil, Korea and other countries protested, but it was only when the European Union protested and said "no", that brought a response. What did the European Union do? It didn't put counter tariffs on US steel, but said, "well, who are the leading US senators on the Senate Commerce Committee, and on the House Trading Committee, and what does their state export to Europe? We will put tariffs on California grapes, Vermont cheese, and Florida orange juice. We will hit you differently." Then the senators from those states became alarmed and they put pressure on the senators from the steel-producing states to back off and drop the tariffs. So here we see an equally strong contender on the commercial trading chessboard.

I might also mention that this European entity as you know is developing its own currency, though it isn't yet complete to all of the members. The euro is only shared by the core members, but it is becoming the second World Reserve Currency. For instance, many of the oil-producing nations in the Persian Gulf are selling their oil in euros not just dollars. The population of Europe is much larger now than that of the US at well over 400 million. Perhaps if you put Canada and Mexico in, maybe it would be about the same. Still, Europe is a larger market.

Also, there is the challenge that Americans are really puzzling about; the rise of Asia, and particularly the rise of China. Is this a good thing or a challenging thing? Some US companies like Boeing and Bechtel are making billions of dollars. Others are worried about the competition of Chinese goods, and increasingly, Chinese services. Of course services coming out of India are worrisome too, where the advantage of possessing the English language means that in south India now, hundreds of thousands of

well-trained Indians are writing software programs and doing insurance settlement claims. I come from the state of Connecticut. Hartford Connecticut boasts to be the insurance capital of the world. But every night the car or house insurance claims paperwork is being sent to Bangalore, settled overnight and sent back. We are outsourcing the insurance industry, and even investment banking. Even companies like Merrill Lynch and American Express are setting up their offices not only in London, Paris, or Frankfurt, but also in Mumbai. And you can see the figures tipping; China's steadily becoming the largest exporting country in the world, and the third or fourth largest economy.

Last year in December before last Christmas, a strategy team at Goldman Sachs in London produced this long term projection about how 4 large populous countries in the development world, Brazil, Russia, India, China, it called them the BRICs, it looked at their long-term gross rates and compared them with US, Japan, Germany, Britain. And it said by the year 2050 China would be the number 1 economy. US would be number 2 but India would be catching up fast. And a long way behind would be Japan, Germany, and Britain. It would become a 3 horse race, so this is not a level chessboard according to the Goldman Sachs projections. Now a number of things can happen in 50 years, I don't need to tell professional economists and businessmen that. But you can see that a number of people are thinking that the economic and technological balances of power are shifting again as they have done for hundreds and hundreds of years. Right now we may be in the position that Great Britain was in the 1870-1880s, it was still number one, but the US and imperial Germany were catching up fast.

Then you have certain weaknesses in the American competitiveness, not weaknesses in research and development, research universities, or number of Nobel Prize winners, which it seems to produce, but weaknesses in the fiscal and trade areas. First we see the enormous American Federal Government deficits, which have just become wider in the past four years. This is part-

ly because of the war in Iraq. You now notice that the US government publishes its deficit figures, but it has a small notice stating that it is not counting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is of course the most stupid and insulting way of accounting. If you are a businessman and you are reporting to your shareholders, and you say, "these are last year's losses, but we are not counting the losses in the European market", your board of directors would fire you.

So the deficit is already big, you add to it the additional cost of 200 billion or more for the war in Iraq, and the cost of restoration after the hurricane Katrina, and you have the biggest national government deficits that have ever been seen in world history. Philip II of Spain and Louis XIV of France were very economical compared to President George Bush. And this is paid for by the vast trading surpluses that are earned chiefly by the Asian states; Korea to a certain extent, but in particular, China and Japan. Just last month, 80% of US treasury bonds floated on the market were purchased by Chinese banks and investment houses. Some of the writers at *Business Week* or *Wall Street Journal* tell us not to worry about it, that they have to buy US dollar bonds because there is nothing else they can purchase with their surpluses. But that is *Business Week*. All I can say as a historian of the rise and fall of the great powers is that when a great power becomes so dependant upon purchasing from other countries, it is steadily weakening itself and becoming dependant on decisions being made in other capital cities. This is not healthy, and many bankers as you know are getting scared stiff of the size of the Federal Government and trade deficits. You may have read in the *East Asian Wall Street Journal* that Mr. Paul Volcker said that a big crack up was coming soon, and that these deficits cannot be sustained. If Paul Volcker says that, then I believe it's time to pay attention. So on the economic chess board, the balance of power is not exclusively in America's hands, it's much more contested and there are some significant weaknesses, they are not impossible, but they need to be addressed. Since the people in the White House don't pay attention to this and continue to listen to

the economic advisors who tell them not to worry, the weaknesses are not being dealt with

Now I move on to the third playing field by which American power has been measured. This is Professor Joseph Nye's notion of soft power. When he invented that term in his book 'Bound to Lead', he was convincing in stating that soft power was a way of influencing people to do things that America would like to be done. Soft power made you popular among a broader group of the foreign population. Soft power couldn't be measured in the way you measure the number of aircraft carriers, it was intangible, but it was there. And I believe that professor Nye's assumption was that soft power was another American strength. The power included the English language media communications, CNN, Internet, advertisements, and American multinational corporations. Also, at a different level, youth culture and power, blue jeans, Marlboro man, valley girls, MTV; all this made America attractive and recognized across the world. Of course he was comparing the US with the Soviet Union. If you think about it, it was a very easy comparison. Can any of you remember Mr. Breshnev's Soviet Union seeming very attractive and having a lot of soft power? Of course it didn't.

But soft power can be eroded and lost. You can weaken your soft power just as you can weaken your fiscal power. And I think only a few neo-conservatives in the US would deny that American political, diplomatic, and cultural influence has not been significantly diminished in the past few years. You may say that this is policy-oriented, that a large number of people say they still love America, but they don't like those guys in the white house, or they still like Americans, but they hate the neo-cons, or they disapprove of the policy in Iraq. They still go to Disney world but they disapprove of the US government's boycott of International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Convention on the Rights of Women and the Child; all of the arrogant unilateralist policies.

These are reducing the estimation of America in my mind and also in my children's minds. They are growing up to think that America is an arrogant cowboy state. The PEW foundation in Philadelphia has for many years been conducting an international opinion poll on how people in 35-45 different countries all over the world rate the US. And in every one of the countries, the percentage of approval of American policy and even America itself has gone down. Think of the images we saw of the disaster in New Orleans after the hurricane Katrina tore that city apart; of the richer white Americans getting into their SUVs and driving away from the hurricane, leaving the poor black inner city Americans alone and destitute with American administration incapable of responding. This was a further body blow to the American image. It showed America as an unfair and racist society.

This can be recovered. Wise policies from the top, policies that are more multi-lateralist, that work more with UN, that in diplomacy listen carefully to the South Korean government about the north; policies that listen to the concerns of the European nations, Caribbean nations, can be adjusted. But right now in terms of the playing field of influence, political attractiveness, and culture, I would say the US has weakened considerably.

So in summation, I would say if we took professor Joseph Nye's notion of three levels of measurement, the US relative to other countries of the world is decidedly the number one military power, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't have military and security challenges. At the level of economics and technology, it is now among perhaps two other equals, and is suffering greatly, potentially riding for big shock because of its federal and trading deficits. And at the third level that I just described, I will not repeat myself. I think the US today is in a state of unpopularity with so many public opinions across the world, that if you brought back to life Franklin Roosevelt or JFK, and you told them how unpopular America was in India, Italy, Germany, even in their ally Great Britain, Roosevelt and Kennedy would be aston-

ished and would say, "how could this ever have been allowed to happen?"

So I therefore bring you a very mixed balance sheet of American power in the world today; it is enormous, but certainly not perfect. It is strong, but not without serious weaknesses.

Questions & Answers

Q I don't know whether you caught yesterday's *Financial Times* with the column by Francis Fukuyama who mentioned similar subject matter of the Bush administration's foreign policy in which he mentioned hegemon. He felt that one of the problems of the hegemony was competence. It has to be benevolent that the US claims but it also has a problem that is demonstrated in Iraq and New Orleans. There is the problem of the US hegemon. He also mentioned something interesting about fairly widespread anti-American sentiment after the Iraq war. How would you view the fact that as you see the rise and fall in powers, as the power becomes eminent, there is almost inevitable feeling of jealousy and resentment from all other nations? So I wanted to ask you about the problems that the US faces today as it relates to the latent resentment of the people just by the force of the fact that the US was a hegemon for a long time, and the fact that in their mind, the US competence as a hegemon has declined.

A This is an important and good point. Is the number one country always going to be the subject of some envy just because it's number one? If you go to the monkey cage at a zoo, and sitting in the corner is a huge 500-pound gorilla, you are always nervous of it, perhaps envious of its strength, even if it is doing nothing. If the 500-pound gorilla starts to do bad things, you get even more nervous. But its sheer size alone causes you resentment. Imperial Rome was number one for 450 years. Did the ancient Britons and inhabitants of Spain really like that or did

they just accept it? And when the first public opinion polls after American intervention in Iraq were produced in US newspapers showing that US popularity was going downhill, the neo conservatives gave precisely the argument that they will always be jealous because we are number one. If France was number we would all be jealous of them, it is human nature.

All I would say is that it seems to me that earlier American Presidents and administrations realized that their becoming number one by the end of World War II would make others automatically envious and concerned. And therefore, one of the tricks for the number one power was the politics of reassurance; You assure your smaller weaker friends and allies that you are not going to misuse your power, and you aren't going to behave irresponsibly. You assure them that you are going to create international organizations and instruments, which within your and other countries' powers can be contained by rules. You can see this in the instructions to the American delegations when they went to Barton Oaks, and Bretton Woods and San Francisco in 1944 and 1945. They were told to go find instruments and organizations, so the sheer size of American raw power was disguised. I think Eisenhower and Kennedy felt this way. The present administrations' advisors do not think that way. Occasionally, they will use international instruments when they want a UN declaration against terrorism, but they won't use international machinery in such a way as to constrain their own power or freedom of power.

Q If you look a little into the future, it seems to me there may be a few self-correcting mechanisms as well. I think that a crucial factor when we're talking about declining American influence on the cultural, political, and ideological level has been this perception that the US is increasingly relying on military power and prioritizing of tools in the foreign policy area. I think this is probably the key to this erosion of support for the US in the world. I think domestically in the US, there is a growing concern about what the US has gotten into in Iraq. You talked about imperial overstretch, and I think there is a growing feeling that the US in

something it cannot control. I think because of that, you are already beginning to see a weakening of the unilateralist tendencies even in the administration. Some of the strongest unilateralists have actually left the administration. And I think the political process in the US to a certain extent can regulate this phenomenon by itself.

My prediction is that maybe next time you will see a fairly strong reaction to what has happened. You will see a more balanced foreign policy in terms of weighing the different power tools in the future and that will in itself improve relations with the rest of the world.

A I couldn't agree more with you that we may be looking at a unilateralist moment, a large number of the neo conservatives I used to debate three or four years ago about the wisdom of going into Iraq, Iad Leutvack, and Michael Reuben who said, "it is easy, you just go in and take over Iraq, and then move to Syria and then you move to Iran". They had all the headlines; they didn't care about UN, or about world opinion, because they thought they couldn't do anything. Those neo conservatives are now really rather quiet. The critics are emerging, I personally think the senate should've been much more critical even three or four years ago, but they're beginning to creep out of their holes and offer criticisms.

We now know that the US military especially the army and marine core bitterly dislike Mr. Rumsfeld, for his so-called new restructuring policies of five years ago and for the overstretch. I don't know any American General who approves of Mr. Rumsfeld. So they are going back and their congressmen is listening to them. No US congressman wants to criticize the US Army or Marine Corps, but when the US Marine Corps comes back and criticizes the Pentagon, it's a different matter. Public opinion polls are swinging, the American losses in the field are rising, the cost is rising, the promises that this would be a fairly short campaign and that there would be these willing Iraqi democratic leaders like

Mr. Challabi just waiting like George Washington to take over control, have proven worthless,

And yes, I think there will be a swing of the pendulum. It seems that the swing must come back to the center, it swing back more extreme. Whether it can repair all the damage that was done, I don't know; I think it may take more time to repair the damage than it took to cause it. And in the eyes of many public opinions and governments, the next American administration will be, if you like, on prohibition. But there is no doubt that the reverse side of the growing dislike of American policies in the past few years has been to see better more liberal and international American policies, and if there's evidence of that, I think that PEW trusts polling results will show a turn towards greater approval and liking of the US in the world

Q I have been a reader of your books for many years and I very much admire your intellectual contribution to political science. I suppose your books are read in the centers of power also. I'd like to ask you a single question. If you were a policy maker, what would be the diplomatic implications of your assessment? If you were invited by your country to write a diplomatic agenda, an immediate diplomatic task for your foreign policy, could you summarize the two or three main tasks of your diplomacy? Another way to put my question is, do you believe in pure multilaterallism?

A that is a fair question, why? Because academics and people who write; I write every two weeks for the LA times syndicate and I can vent my arguments and frustrations, but I am not sitting in the seat of power and decision making. When you sit in those seats, you very quickly realize how many constraints are upon you; things aren't so simple when you go to the state department, as it is what you are writing your column at Harvard or Yale. So it's quite proper to ask what positive policies one may have, not just negative criticisms. It's a fair point.

I would say that I would instruct the American diplomatic service and the secretary of state to work in a quiet reassuring way to let the other ambassadors and foreign ministries know that we do wish to be more cooperative, more multilateralist. The big policy statement from the White House, “oh mea culpa, mea maxima culpa, we were too unilateralist, now we’re going to be team players”, is rather silly and dramatic. However, to let the word out that in this complicated world we need to work more with our partners is another thing, because it sets the tone, and as you know from your professional career, diplomatic tone and political tone are very important.

Second, the National Security Council has to have a very hard look at the extent of the deployment of American power across the globe, and has to form some degree of prioritization. This is very tricky especially in Washington, because every top secret document in Washington is immediately leaked. So if you say terrorism is number one priority, number two is middle east oil, stability of Europe is number three, containing rogue states is number four, reassuring south Korea is number 11, then that will be immediately leaked and the Korean media will be very worried, and the Korean ambassador will be running to the state department. Nonetheless a careful assessment of which are the most significant placement strategic economic and political interests in the globe and which are not, and a corollary to that would be to try to identify areas which are not first-class interests to America, but nonetheless should be helped either by some of America’s friends like the European union, or by international agencies.

It’s very difficult to see that much of Africa is of great strategic significance to the US. Even if you say there are some rogue states or some Muslim cells, it is not. But that doesn’t mean that Africa is a total wipe off, it is a diplomatic recognition that the European union can play a more knowledgeable and significant role than can the US, who should be in the second supporting position in this case. There should be an assessment as to how

many air bases and supply bases the US really needs in central Asia. There should be a careful assessment of this Pentagon budget. The fact is that the large numbers of defense weapons items are not being ordered by the Pentagon but by the congressmen and senators in whose district the manufacturing plant exists. The US Marine Corps does not want the Osprey helicopter, but 5-6 powerful congressmen want them for jobs.

These sorts of assessments are quiet and I think there should be a reconsideration of the suspicious and negative policies of the US towards international protocols and treaties. There are two ways to handle newly emerging and negotiated protocols and treaties. One of them is to be like Mr. John Bolton and say, "nonsense, stupid, they are against American interests". The other way is to be like someone else like Negro Ponte to say, "well, there are parts of this Kyoto Protocol, which are inconsistent and unfair. You are asking American industry to make certain sacrifices, but you are not asking the equivalent industries in India and China to make the same sacrifices. You are setting up standards for us, which are different than those you are setting for others. You are asking for a doubling or tripling of overseas aid for the 60 poorest countries, we can agree to that, but we can't agree to the money just being handed over to corrupt governments, so we will not sign this protocol about tripling foreign aid, unless there is a whole set of guarantees and monitoring. We won't agree to the demands made by the North Korean government on getting a light water reactor unless there is significant international technical supervision of what is going on." It is worth pointing out to the North Korean government that last year and the year before when Colonel Gadaffi decided to give up nuclear processing possibilities for his country, 6 months before he made the announcement public, he invited British Secret Service and the CIA; they were already confidentially working in all of the Libyan plants, so they could tell their governments, it's now clean.

So there are diplomatic and clever ways in which you send out the messages that you want to cooperate, that you're not giv-

ing away American interests, but you're asking for sensible compromises. The American government itself makes sensible compromises in regard to allocations of grants to the UN population Fund, but it could be more sensible in isolating or distinguishing the issue of abortion per se, from giving monetary support to education programs for young girls and women in developing countries. So I would say that without blowing the trumpet and saying "we have recanted and are different, we are the good Americans again", you can by a series of signals and measures alter the atmosphere and tone, then you can see how relieved other nations will be, and they'll want to come work with you again instead of being critical. That's my belief.

Q You just mentioned North Korea. Consequently, I would like to bring the North Korean nuclear issue into your military power chessboard. Yesterday, China successfully launched the second manned space flight, and China now challenges the US military power status. Beijing, we had the 6 party talks and I believe that with the US and China, maybe the 6 party talks can produce the resolution for the North Korean nuclear standoff. My question is, if we succeed in attaining a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, (I would like to ask your assessment on this possibility too), if China and North Korea wish the US forces to be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula, what is the US response to this request? Second, the Taiwan issue is very critical in shaping up the bilateral US-China military and diplomatic relations; to what extent could the Taiwan issue be interrelated to the North Korean nuclear issues as well as Korea's unification road map?

A I hope the 6 party negotiations will continue and begin to make more progress. Winston Churchill once said, "jaw, jaw, not war, war", which means, talk, not war, and I believe in that. I would hope to see progress and see the regime in North Korea realize that it will get benefits, but it will have to also modify some of its hard-line positions and demands, and we will be looking forward to intermediate diplomacy to persuade North Korea to be more tolerant. If the specific issue of the withdrawal

of the US armed forces from the Peninsula of Korea becomes part of the package, then I think every trained diplomat could see that nobody is talking about the instant removal of all military installations and personnel.

There is no reason why there cannot be a certain calibration if this amount of progress is made on the nuclear inspection, and the North Korean forces are withdrawn or reduced in size from their proximity to the DMZ. And if certain other concessions are made, we will then produce a timetable for the not rushed, but steady diminution of American armed forces in the peninsula, and we will reserve the right to move back in there fast if the other side shows signs of breaking its side of the contract. This is the way two hostile sides have achieved a more stable relationship; you don't go for instant dramatic actions, but for callibrated and measured actions. And I'm hopeful that something like that can happen.

Your second question is an altogether more difficult for me as well as for the US administration and virtually impossible for the Chinese government. Introduction of linkage between the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and any prospect of a nuclear issue with regards to the future of Taiwan and Taiwanese PRC relations, that linkage will be resisted publicly as well as privately by Beijing, it is too much of a national sovereignty issue for them. The ongoing crisis going on in North Korea is an embarrassment on China's northeastern frontier, but it's not a nationality issue, and the attempt to link them, I think would complicate the North Korean negotiations rather than to assist them. I am not a great expert on the triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and the two Koreas; I just suspect that if you introduce Taiwan, you introduce a big complication rather than assisting the possibility of compromise with North Korea.

China “Rising”: What Lessons for Today from the Past?*

Bernard K. Gordon

Anyone who comes before this audience and says with certainty what China’s impact will be on East Asian and world politics, and what its prospects will be even five years from now (to say nothing of 10 or 20 years in the future), is either a fool or a knave or both. We cannot know in detail those issues, but in terms of the earlier history of international politics, both in Europe and Asia, it’s fair to say “we’ve been here before” and we can at least ask the right questions.

Let me begin with a personal note: when I was at the University of Chicago I was fortunate to have known and to have studied with Hans J. Morgenthau. His name is known to many of you because his writings remain the most influential of all about the forces that motivate nations in their relations with one another. In 1952, well before I met him, I encountered his book, In Defense of the National Interest. It dealt heavily with Asia and the West in the early cold war period, when the war here in Korea was still raging. That was just three years after Mao Tse-tung’s 1949 victory, and what was then widely thought to be the close Sino-Soviet relationship. But unlike most others at the time, Morgenthau stressed not the Sino-Soviet tie, but China’s nationalism. Here’s what he wrote:

We did not ask in what measure the Chinese revolutionwas the genuine result of Chinese discontent. Nor ...whether ...China was necessarily committed to [the USSR’s] imperialistic policies that were

* Transcription of a speech given at the IGE/Samsung Electronics Global Business Forum on Thursday, October 28, 2005

bound to endanger our interests in the Far East...The result has been a debacle... [China is] the most populous nation on earth, rich in untapped resources, and animated with a new spirit of national pride and mission...our failure in China constitutes one of the most resounding defeats our foreign policy has ever sustained.¹⁾

He wrote those words--China "is animated with a new spirit of national pride and mission"-- fifty-five years ago. Likewise, in his principal book, Politics Among Nations, a key point was his emphasis on the continuing role of nationalism in world politics. And later, in my own work on Southeast Asia, I repeatedly experienced how correct he was. So before I say anything about CHINA, I want to spend a few minutes first on the role of **nationalism** in world affairs. Then I'll connect it to the issue of CHINA RISING.

I

In the past generation it's become fashionable, among both statesmen and scholars, to argue that nationalism was declining or even already dead. The idea took hold in the 1950s and flourished in the 60s and '70s. The result is that in some circles it's now common to hear that more important than old-style nationalism something else stands in its place: something called the "international community," along with "rules of international law."

I've never seen much persuasive evidence for that view and therefore I've never believed it. To people who did have that view, I would say go to Thailand, or Vietnam, or Korea, or Indonesia, and when you return then tell me that nationalism is on the decline. That was 20 and 30 years ago, and nothing has changed, and needless to say, I found the same in Japan, where I've lived three times for about a year each. And to anyone who

¹⁾ Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York, Knopf, 1952), p.205.

argues today that nationalism is a weak force I say "go to India, go to China," and when you come back tell me again that nationalism is on the decline. This past Spring I was in India, and when I visited with young people at their schools, I was regularly treated to emotional outbursts that said, quite literally, "we are prepared to die for Mother India."

On two earlier occasions, in rural western and southern China, I heard much the same sentiments. Sometimes of course it was in connection with Taiwan, but generally it applied much wider: the sense among others was that China had been down for two or more centuries, and would soon again be a "great power." And by the way, quite removed from China, I recently heard near-identical nationalist views voiced in **Turkey**. Young people were talking about their nation, and with great pride spoke of their strong national identity as Turks.

None of this should be surprising because the existence of nationalism is near-universal. Only in a very few Western European states—you can probably count them on the fingers of one hand—is nationalism definitely down or on the way out. Those few are the nations that recently and directly experienced multiple wars in the past two centuries. In those places, people today often want to be regarded as simply "European," rather than as Belgians, Frenchmen, Swedes or Norwegians. Their nationalism declined when the memories of the blood, death, and fires of the Second World War were all very strong.

In some developing nations and regions a variation on this "end of nationalism" also appeared in that same early postwar period--and soon died. Remember "Pan-Africanism" and the slogans of "Pan-Arabism" and "Arab nationalism"? The idea was to "transcend" the separate state-identities of the Middle East nations, and bring them together under the cloak of the "Arab nation." But it is clear today that all such "trans-national" movements have no life at all, though some still dream of burying the separate Islamic nations under a blanket of "the

Muslim Nation." Their goal is to build a single "Islamic Caliphate." It would reach from the Arabian Peninsula in the West to Pakistan in the East, and then to Malaysia, Indonesia, parts of Thailand and to the southern Philippines.

None of that will happen, because none of these "cross-national" movements are rooted in a particular people in a particular time and place. They lack the powerful force of nationalism that is found in today's Middle East, and which is strongly reflected in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, and others too numerous to mention. Nationalism is strong even in Iraq, although it is less clear whether the attachment is to the single-state of Iraq or to the separate and smaller identities of the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi-ites.

All this is by way of saying that everywhere on the globe strong nationalism is the norm, and not the exception. What this points to is that despite the justified attention now given to "globalization," we need at the same time to accept that nationalism remains an equally key force.

II

China of course is not only no exception to that rule, but is instead a prime illustration—though in China a special emphasis applies. That's because all Chinese know that for well over 200 years their nation was weaker than many others and suffered the doctrine of "extra-territoriality." That fancy word means that within China, more powerful foreigners--the French, the British, the Russians and the Germans-- had their own separate territorial enclaves. Within those enclaves French, British, Russian and German law, rather than Chinese law, set the rules of behavior. In passing I have to mention that the one nation that did not practice that principle of extra-territoriality was the United States. The US held instead to the principle of the "Open Door" in China, which meant that all nations, on an equal basis, should be able to trade and deal with China.

The US also stressed the "territorial integrity" of China, which meant there was to be no splitting-up of China. That process of dividing China's territory began in the late years of the 19th century, when the French carved out "Indochina" from China's south, and established the separate protectorates and colonies of Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos.

This carving-up reached its zenith when Japan invaded China's three northern provinces that we call Manchuria. Japan re-named it Manchukuo, but I don't need to tell this audience about Japan's actions. As you all know, in territories the Japanese took over, their practice was to "re-name" them, and insist that the people who lived there not only learn to read and speak Japanese, but also change their family names to Japanese-sounding names.

Now let me turn to one of the reasons why the term "China Rising" has gained so much recent attention. It is largely because in 20th century history, the case of Germany provides at least one other important illustration of a nation "rising." That development led to great political instability and eventually to two world wars. It is often suggested therefore that the international "system" at the time did not properly deal with the new factor Germany represented. Those who make that case argue that today's international system must do a better job of incorporating a rising China than it did with a rising Germany. To see if this analogy may fit, let's look back to that earlier case of a nation "rising."

In the last years of the 19th and early years of the 20th century Germany gained new prominence, not only in military and naval affairs, but as a world center --and sometimes the world leader-- in science, culture and intellectual activity. In science think Einstein and Freud; in Music think Gustav Mahler and Richard Wagner; in Philosophy and Society think Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber. But compared with his brain in scientific, intellectual, and artistic capacities mankind's **political** brain is a backward organ, and the result was a series of political miscalculations that brought on the First World War. It ended in Germany's defeat

which led to German "**revanchism**"-- the belief that Germany had been "deprived" of its rightful place among nations, and that the error must be corrected.

Hitler of course capitalized on the belief in revanchism, and he exploited it. If you watch the films of Hitler speaking to Germany's adoring masses, you will see that because of the belief in Germany as the victim of wrongs, he appealed successfully to German nationalism. The result: that Germany ultimately worked to overturn the international "rules" that had been imposed on it by the Treaty of Versailles.

III

Today's analysts warn that today's international system, unlike the one that could not deal with prewar Germany, must deal better with the new "rising" power China represents. But the analogy is false, for at least four main reasons. The first is that Germany, especially after 1933, was committed to two goals: to overthrow the then-system of world politics, and to make Germany the dominant power in Europe and probably beyond. But the international system as it was then structured could not accommodate a German "rise" that included that fundamental goal of overthrowing the system. Ultimately conflict and war were inevitable, and the question today is whether, in the context of China Rising, war and conflict is similarly inevitable.

The answer to that question is most certainly **NO** for at least two reasons. The first, as US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick reminded the world only four weeks ago, is that in his words, "*China does not believe its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system.*"²⁾ Second, today's Asia-Pacific world is starkly different from the European world

2) "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations September 21, 2005, New York

that Germany saw in the 1930s. Some of you may recall the old Soviet formulation of the "constellation of forces." The "constellation of forces" in prewar Europe was such that both France and England were weakly armed, badly led, and in the case of France especially, without the political will to resist Germany's military rise.

The circumstances in today's Asia are quite different: today's Asia is the scene not only of the United States, which is neither weakly armed nor lacking in will, but of Japan and several important others. Each, stemming from its own very strong nationalism, possesses high military potential and much political will. That does not mean we need to precisely calibrate the military capacities of the Asia-Pacific nations. It **does** mean that unlike the situation with Hitler, who saw only a flat open field with no effective opposition, China today surveys a strikingly different scene. Where Hitler saw only frightened rabbits, Asia today is populated with **porcupines**—some big, others medium and small, but all porcupines nevertheless.

Political scientists like me call that "multi-polarity": a region where several centers of power possess both strong political will and much present and potential military capability. The end result is that today's Asian environment sharply differs from the much weaker and "open" system that Germany confronted in the 1930s.

The second major difference is that a crucially important economic lesson of earlier centuries has been learned. It has to do with resources and markets. In past years nations aimed to achieve "autarky," i.e., to be either self-sufficient or physically control foreign sources of resources. But post-World War II Japan and Germany both have shown that it is no longer necessary to directly occupy and control territory in order to benefit from its economic resources. Today's globalization era means that foreign resources and markets can be, and are drawn on, without conquering or directly controlling those foreign resources and

markets. And China, in ways that were never dreamed of by Germany's leaders, has clearly learned that lesson.

Its products have universal reach; it is the scene of major inward FDI; and it is also now itself a growing source of FDI outflows. That last item, China's FDI abroad, came into public prominence two months ago with the attempted purchase of an American-owned oil company, and earlier, when Lenovo, a China-owned firm bought IBM's laptop subsidiary. On the issue of globalization, Secretary Zoellick summed it up last month: he said that China's leaders under Deng Xiaoping decided "*to embrace globalization, rather than detach themselves from it.*"

A **third** difference with the German analogy is that Germany had an avowed and central racial element that was integral to its rise. Germany frankly viewed the Poles, Russians, and other East Europeans (and of course the Jews) as inferior people whose fate must be subjected to Germany's will.

Yes, there is an undeniable ethnic element to China's nationalism, but it is primarily directed at peoples who live within China's borders. Those are peoples who are not fully integrated into Han Chinese society and who resent Han Chinese political, cultural, and economic dominance. And of course China takes strong steps to deal with those issues, as it does in Tibet and with the minority peoples in the south and southwest--and most prominently with regard to the Uyghurs in the west.

Yet there is little or no real evidence that China believes in or seeks to dominate or destroy the non-Chinese peoples in the Asia-Pacific region. Neither the Korean, Japanese, Malay-Indonesian, Indian and Caucasian peoples are in the relationship with China that Germany had with the Slavic and Russian peoples.

The **fourth reason** why the analogy doesn't fit is the very different internal political and economics conditions faced by China's leaders today as compared with Germany in the 1930s.

Germany was an advanced industrial society, although the massive inflation of the late 20s and early '30s almost wiped out its middle class. But one of the main reasons Hitler and the Nazis came to power was as a consequence of those problems, and the result was the tremendous popular support he had among Germany's people. They believed that Hitler's leadership and the Nazi party had the capacity to resolve those issues, and they were largely united in their support.

China in contrast is decidedly two economies, and in important respects even three. There is a small and very thin layer at the top, with incomes and spending habits that rival the West. And in the coastal cities, and some others like Nanchang and Kunming, there is an emerging and sometimes vibrant middle class. But despite China's remarkable economic advances, a very deep truth also applies. There are roughly 900 million largely-poor rural Chinese, and of that number **200-300 million are** desperately-poor peasants. They subsist on one dollar a day and their back-breaking lives are in large measure spent in an essentially **pre-19th century environment**. That reality points to the single most important issue that China's leadership faces today.

It is euphemistically referred to as China's potential for "social unrest." Political Scientists like me refer to it as the issue of "political legitimacy." It comes to China's leaders in two ways: one is the always-feared danger, rooted in China's history, of disaffected regions and peoples who might violently threaten the regime's legitimacy.

The other and more serious worry is of China's grossly uneven income distribution. The split is largely along rural-urban lines, and it is often tied at the local level both to official corruption and official non-responsiveness. That is the combination that raises the prospect of "social unrest" of the sort that could threaten the leadership of the Communist Party.

China's leaders recently have shown they understand how

severe this problem is. Ironically it is also the price of China's two decades of economic accomplishments. The core of the issue is that China's 9-9.5 percent economic growth has been fueled by its exports. Those exports—or I should say the prices of those exports—have caused growing irritation with most of China's trade partners, ranging from the US, the EU and Japan to Brazil and Argentina. Rising protectionism and strained bilateral relations have resulted, most notably with the US, as reflected in US Treasury Secretary Snow's just-ended visit to China.

Snow has been under heavy pressure in Congress to insist that Beijing must alter the value of its currency, hopefully to reduce America's massive trade deficit with China. But such pressures inevitably take on the appearance of anti-Chinese "threats," and in the context of China's long experience with foreigners threats are deeply to be avoided. China's nationalism and China's pride will not take threats.

Fortunately, however, Beijing's leaders apparently now recognize that their best course lies in a policy-shift that deals both with their internal and external problems simultaneously. The key to the policy is to reduce China's single-minded emphasis on "exports alone," aided by a measured rise in the value of its currency. Precisely that shift was signaled early in the summer, and last week it was underlined again to Secretary Snow. As it takes hold, it will at least slow the growth of China's trade surplus with the US, and begin to lower it a bit. That will deal with that major bilateral irritant in US-China relations, and at the same time add to China's ability to spend more on domestic needs.

High on that domestic list is China's acknowledged need to improve the full range of its **rural** infrastructures; they include transport, education, and social services. That in itself will help lessen the potentially powerful political divide that now separates the lives of China's mainly rural poor from those in the cities. And beyond that, if "social unrest" is to be avoided Party leaders

now recognize that more of China's new wealth must go to improving rural incomes and rural-area purchasing power.

IV

Now, having said that, I know I haven't covered everything, and I've ignored some important economic issues. For example I've not talked about a fear that was widely-expressed in East Asia two and three years ago—that China would absorb the bulk of FDI, starving others in Asia of their investment needs. But that hasn't materialized: indeed the flood of FDI to China has begun to slow, and last year more went to Britain than China. And here in Korea, inward FDI was higher in 2003 than the year before.


Likewise, I've not talked here about a major concern the US has: that East Asian countries, led by China, will be developing an East Asian "Community" that excludes the US. In May, Richard Armitage, the recently- retired Deputy Secretary of State, spoke about these proposals. He characterized them as "a thinly veiled way to make the point that the United States is not totally welcomed in Asia," and he added that "China is quite willing to be involved in *fora* that don't include the United States."³) His successor, Robert Zoellick, addressed the same issue last month in his New York speech. Let me quote his warning:

concerns will grow if China seeks to maneuver toward a predominance of power. Instead, we should work together with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and others for regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

In a few weeks, when APEC meets in Busan, we'll see whether those words were heard. If not, and if indeed China continues to promote what the US fears—"a line down the Pacific" that excludes the US, that will be a very negative sign. A prime

3) Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, 2 May 2005.

reason is that the US is, and will remain very definitely an Asia-Pacific power no less than China, Korea, or Japan. As I will show you now, the Pacific region accounts for more than a quarter of US total merchandise exports. Western Europe's share – at 23 percent-- is consistently smaller than the 26 percent of US exports sent to the Pacific Region. Overall, as the slide will now show, the shares of US exports sent to the world's three main economic regions remains remarkably even, and that global distribution is absolutely unique to the United States. It is the crucial underpinning for America's also-unique tripolar strategic investment, and it underscores the enduring importance to all Americans of their nation's vital political and strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region.



Now you may say I've painted too rosy a picture of "China Rising," I think not, because there's evidence that leaders in Beijing and especially Washington are quite deliberately aware of the stakes involved in their relations. A good example is last week's first-time trip to China, including a visit to Beijing's

strategic nuclear command, by US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. He has sought more "transparency" in China's military build-up and the visit was a step in that direction. Likewise, the recent speech by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick is prime evidence that the US sees the need for both nations to follow Hans Morgenthau's advice: that is, to see the world from the other side's vantage point as well as your own.

Yes, there are important challenges to both, and in both Western and the Chinese government there are elements who will see threats and dangers lurking everywhere. This summer the head of China's Defense Academy made statements that some in the US heard as direct threats; just as some American defense analysts argue that indeed China is hell-bent on expelling America from East Asia. Such things are to be expected from both sides, and it will remain the task of the most senior political leaders in both capitals to make judgements that put those views into perspective. They are surrounded by people who do recognize the stakes involved and are familiar with each nation's historical perspective, and that's why I'm moderately optimistic.

Finally, of course, I've not touched on the one explosive issue that could bring China and the United States into a direct confrontation, and that is the issue of Taiwan. China will need to hold to its policy of integrating Taiwan only by peaceful means, but that also puts a major constraint on American policy. And that's where I want to conclude—with a reference back to where I started, with Hans J. Morgenthau. A half-century ago he wrote that major powers must insist only on what is essential in their relations, and be prepared to compromise on what is non-essential.

On the issue of Taiwan, as if he were seeing the future, Morgenthau had this advice: "**Never allow a Weak Ally to Make Decisions for you.**" That's a central lesson, with relevance to Taiwan. So I'd conclude on this note: precisely because both China and the United States recognize that they have a major

stake in avoiding a conflict that would destroy them both, there is good reason to be cautiously optimistic about the long-term consequences of “China Rising.”

Questions & Answers

Q Thank you professor Gordon for the reference to the Portuguese, it was a very interesting historical reference. I had the privilege to be the first Consulate General of Portugal in Macau, and I witnessed a very smooth transition from the 430 years of administration to the new special administrative region of China. I can emphasize how good our relations with China are despite this historical past. I suppose that intelligent people can assume the past in a very intelligent way, and Portugal and China prove this exactly.

I am a professional who has been interested in China for many years. I was director of the Asia department in the University of Lisbon 15 years ago, and China was always a subject of curiosity and intellectual passion for me. Again and again I go to China and am astonished by the degree of development of the country, the assertiveness of its politics and will the leadership shows to occupy a place compatible with the size and history of this beautiful country. When we witness the accommodations now underway in order to create a place for China in the world and in the economy, I'd like to ask you a question. How do you see for instance, the beginning of this effort of this accommodation when for instance the US and EU negotiate textiles with China. In order to create a space for China, China should be able to have a share in the world economy, which also means the labor forces in China should be able to reach the global market with their products. This is the trend we witness now, but the way the other economic partners are negotiating these accommodations with China is very much the testimony of how either the US or EU see China entering the world economy. I would like to hear your

comments on these first negotiations in order to accommodate China.

Q I also noticed your reference to the European experience, especially with Western Europe; you said that perhaps this was one of the exceptions, that nationalism was maybe not on the rise there. Maybe it's not on the rise, but recent events in Western Europe, for example, negative votes in two of the most pro-European Union members, France and the Netherlands, clearly indicate that patriotism or national identity has not disappeared as a phenomenon in Western Europe. But it is true, and I think that it is an important experience not only of WWI and WWII, but of the longer period of time, that there is a deep skepticism towards the more ugly aspects of nationalism, which has really traumatized and hurt Europe on many occasions in the past. And that is why in a way, to me, the very notion of nationalism--maybe because of my background as a European--is negative. To me, patriotism I can understand and accept, but nationalism is something dangerous and irrational, something based on distorted views of the world and on historical falsifications as well. Thus, in my opinion, something it is something very dangerous. And for that reason also, I share your view that it's impossible to predict what will happen in this part of the world. And I think it is the most crucial part of the world right now because we have such a dynamic change happening, but I really think it's impossible to say where we will be in 5-10 years.

But I think there is a real risk that nationalism in China and elsewhere can lead to irrational behavior and that also nationalism in different parts of Asia will be able to feed on each other in a negative way, that we'll see vicious self-enforcing circles. I was ambassador to Japan before I came here, and there's no question that in Japan, there is a much more skeptical view of China and their intentions than there were 10 years ago: much more doubt as to what China's long-term strategy is, if there even is one. And also a feeling that perhaps the government in China, which doesn't have a clear ideology or maybe has a hard time

referring to written ideology, has replaced it to a certain extent with a nationalistic ideology. Again, partly based on certain interpretations of historical facts that the Japanese do not agree with. I think there is a real risk that we can enter a vicious circle and see growing tensions in this area. I really hope that cooler heads will prevail, and I think as long as we keep talking and referring to the realities of the situations and try to lower attention to nationalistic feelings, I think that we may be able to deal with but this hints that there are some real dangers.

And the parallel to Germany is an interesting one. But it is possible that the pattern here would be different, that you can have a dangerous destabilizing situation that doesn't follow the German model, which would be a uniquely Asian phenomenon with unique Asian features.

A First to the ambassador from Portugal; in connection with the multi-fiber issue, there I will reveal to you if you don't have it already that I have free market views on such issues, and my feeling is that the nations that are now complaining in EU and in the US and in some of the developing nations that are now severely impacted by China's export of low-priced textiles. They were put on notice: there was plenty of warning that this development would take place with China's accession to the WTO. And we've all seen this comedy of errors that took place in Western Europe in regards to panties and braziers and all the rest of it in connection with Europe's concerns to have sufficient imports on hand for the Christmas season market. They were very upset with the European Trade Commissioner for agreeing with a curtailment. Essentially, I think I want to agree with what I took to be the thrust of your statement which is China has an obligation to its own low-paid salary workers who are capable of producing large quantities of low-cost, low-priced textile goods for the world market. And it strikes me that as sad as it may seem from the perspective of those who are in Bangladesh, or Guatemala, or Mexico; they were forewarned that this development would in fact take place. So if we expect China to follow the rules of the

WTO, then we cannot say on the other side, "no this is separate from the rules, you can't do this". My feeling is rather simple, that we will be on stronger ground to insist that China adhere to all of those other WTO rules in particular connection with intellectual property. If we say at the same time, we are honoring the WTO rules with regards to textiles.

To the ambassador of Denmark, I think when you refer to the anti-constitution votes in the Netherlands and France, I don't really think those are on national grounds, but I think it has to do with fear of the future. That was the major issue that resulted especially in the case of the French that led to the "no" vote. There's recognition in France that yes, change must come, but we don't know what it will mean, so they voted "no". However, I don't see that as a renewal of national identities or fears although it comes to us in that manner, because it's only possible to see it in terms of a French or German or Dutch vote. But I don't think it was rooted in the issue of nationalism.

I take your other point very well, that we have no way to know the future, the possibility is very sharp, and I agree with you that while the German analogy in particular probably will not be repeated, there is still this systemic issue that we do have to face. We have an international system of understandings of what it represents and whether it will be challenged by a China rising, which will find its need for challenge in ways that are quite different than Germany in the 1930s: that is a genuine possibility.

My own view is that the potential for political miscalculation however is the most severe one. The dangers of a tremendous miscalculation probably with regards to the issue of Taiwan are the most severe of all, because on that issue the Chinese are, to use your words, "not rational", and I think on the issue of Taiwan, it is not an issue of rational choice of saying "if we do this there will be a nuclear response". The dangers of political miscalculation on that one are enormously high, putting as I said,

tremendous burden on both leaderships.

When I made my reference to India, it really was shocking to me even as much as I know in my head that nationalism is powerful, traveling in India and to hear kids of 13 or 14 with their teachers present saying “yes, I am willing to die for mother India”. That was shocking, it told me again, and I hear people in Turkey saying the same thing with regard to their own identity as Turks regarding the entry to the EU. They take pride in being Turks. There is no way in which we can peacefully deal with this issue, other than to recognize its power and reality and existence. From a European perspective of course, you know more than most of us the evils to which it has led. Morgenthau referred to that extreme form of nationalism demonstrated by Hitler in the 1930s as “integral nationalism”. It was so interwoven into the people’s understanding. But I am afraid to say that in newly emerging societies like India, it has not receded. And there are real dangers, there is no washing it over, it’s just there as a reality.

Q I have two questions: I read A. G. Frank’s *The Reorient*, and according to him, China dominated the world economy and technology until the 18th century, and then the Western Civilization took over the Chinese leadership. In the 21st century he foresaw that China’s revival in terms of world economic and technological leadership, if that happens within say the next 30-50 years, what is the US policy against China--the containment or engagement or balancing policy. I realize this is very serious in recent weeks for the first time, I believe China and Russia had a joint naval exercise over the East Sea, apparently against the US unilateralism, and also to prepare for perhaps a collapse within N. Korea. Simultaneously, China and India are working together on a military front as well. So I want to know what policies the US will take with the China relationship.

Historically, China used to treat neighboring states as barbarian cultures, and they have specific descriptions of those in

the North, West and South. Korea also has been historically treated as the northeastern barbarians. China initiated a project called the Northeast Passage Project, in which Chinese local government in Northeast provinces treated Kokore (one of the three kingdoms era) as a part of Chinese several provincial history. So Koreans became very much annoyed on this aspect. I think that this clearly indicates that China has a rising nationalistic tide. My question is how should Korea respond to China's rising nationalism as well as the cultural superiority treating neighboring countries, especially the Korean peninsula as lesser peoples. I think if this continues, it will cause a serious problem. How should Korea react against China's attempt to treat South Korea as a lower culture?

Q Dr. Gordon, thank you for stimulating us early this morning, it's always a challenge to get up, but is always worth while when a speaker like yourself comes and makes us think beyond the borders that we normally operate in. I never actually thought about China in the context of Germany, but clearly China's rising is a potentially destabilizing force. It's interesting that Dr. Ahns' first question and my own observations are very similar. The fact that two of us are stimulated to ask in a similar vein says perhaps that it's more universally important than we might otherwise think.

China used to be and will again be a dominant economic power, and it will probably happen within the middle part of this century that it will overtake the US in economic terms. And that also implies by 100 years from now, it may be substantially larger than the US economy by several times. There are huge rumors you pointed out for miscalculation in political and economic posture, but my concern is not with China making a miscalculation, but with those who have already invested interest in the status quo making a huge miscalculation. We've already seen evidence of that with the multi-fiber and textiles issues. Those who have created the current world order, WTO, etc, have built into it certain advantages for themselves. With all those

advantages in all their manifestations around the current world order, we do risk creating a situation not unlike that of Germany, where China has to battle against unreasonable resistance from the rest of the world as it emerges.

My biggest concern is with two things: First, that the US has not necessarily fully grasped that a larger partner is coming into the world around it and it has to think more intelligently about the challenges that China faces. The US has to be more accommodating rather than confrontational, and second, there is to me having lived 15 years in the States, but observing it from a distance today, a certain sense of nationalism in the US that carries with it a lot of dangers. Whether it's the unilateralism we've seen recently, who would've thought I would be regretting the loss of Bill Clinton a few years later. But there was a man who was relatively wise about foreign policy. And I'm concerned that today the US holds on backwards on many dimensions and isn't properly preparing itself for a future where China is the largest economy if not the most sophisticated.

China is also the most complicated society the world has ever seen, both historically and perceptively. To illustrate this point I will leave you with one thought. In the West, we consider the game of chess to be the most complex game we play for recreation. Chess is played on an 8x8 board, which is 64 degrees of freedom; we have to reduce that a bit because not all pieces can play equally, so let's call it 40 degrees of freedom. But in China and also in Korea in the name of padok or "go" is used. This game is on a 19x19 board with roughly 400 degrees of freedom, and every piece can move the same. This is an order of magnitude more complex that the Chinese use for simple recreation. As you know IBM can make a computer that can challenge a world grand master in chess, but they cannot make a computer that can do anything better than meet a middle ranked amateur in padok.

So are we really sophisticated enough to prepare for China

rising, not that China will make a miscalculation, but the rest of us will make a series of miscalculations that will back China into a corner where it has no alternative but to create an alternative world order of which your comments about the recent Pacific base initiative might be a first step. We need to try and make sure that China has a role of leadership according to its potential in the world. This means in all forms of world bodies. Their enthusiasm to comply with the WTO seems to suggest that they recognize that there is value in the current world order, but only if we allow them to participate in it on equal footing.

A Dr Ahn asked about the US-China relationship. It is clearly not under the heading of containment that has gone by the boards. That has been dropped from the time of Kissinger's visit in 1971; that is simply finished. There was and are still debates in the US on whether China is a strategic partner or potential adversary. I think even those debates are in favor of a widely spread view, although not at the most senior political leadership in Washington. But certainly at the level of the Secretary of State, there is a clear understanding and acceptance on the policy of engagement, and that applies to the US-Korea relationship as well. It is a clear and welcome change from a South Korean perspective, ever since Condoleezza Rice, (and we all know that her background is in Soviet studies), it's clearly a shift in her attitude towards the North Korean 6 party talks; a policy of engagement has taken over. Not without a concern to not give away the entire shop, but she has clearly authorized Ambassador Hill to engage North Korea, and I gather he will be going to Pyongyang sometime this autumn. The word, "engagement", seems to be the proper term.

In terms of how the US relates to South Korea, we spoke for a few moments about this over dinner last night, but there was some wondering when your new president took over. Of course there was no reason for anyone in this room to wonder, but some Americans wondered whether the new president was completely reliable. I don't say that that view is shared by anyone here, but

I would say now that there is a recognition and willingness in Washington to let this new format play out. There is no reason from an American perspective except for those few uncorrectable extremists, no view in Washington that says there is no point in talking with North Korea. There are still many people who doubt North Korean motives, but there is a clear willingness to engage with them and to support Seoul's policies in that regard. It isn't an easy transition to make for Americans.

In terms of your other question about China's historical attitudes and whether they are to be a matter of current concern, I really cannot answer that, when I think of this, and I'm sure the ambassador from Denmark saw this more often, whenever I am in Japan, I am so constantly made aware of the depth of Japanese nationalism. But the Chinese do it for their own purpose, that's off the historical lessons when it serves their interest. But I can make the point by referring to both the American and Korean relationship with China now in this respect. The game for the future is not a zero sum game, it seems to me that it is a win-win, but it was brought home to me so powerfully when I was here in Seoul in late May and June by the incredible accomplishments by Dr. Hwang. Of course it was very insightful that all of his graduate work was not done in the US or Britain, but all done here in Korea. And that is the path for the future, so what I'm saying here is that it is a ladder, the discoveries, when we consider the implications of his discoveries, and they're going to be repeated around the world in different ways that we cannot foresee.

You asked whether the Americans would be able to deal with a China that is a challenge in all categories. My answer to that is yes, if all of us accept the open-ended approach to human inquiry, and to the potential for human examination. We literally cannot imagine the potential advances we will see in the field of scientific inquiry. My point is to say the Americans understand; I believe that there is no point in looking at the world as if it was a zero sum: if you must win, I must lose, that isn't the way

people nowadays are approaching it is one of the aspects of globalization. And in that respect, I don't think we'll see a new rivalry developing along those traditional national lines.

Q I was very impressed with Mr. Gordon's speech. I read a book called *US Military Government History in Korea*, written in 1947 by Richard Lauterbach. And also, a book called *The Situation in Asia* written by Owen Latimoa. According to him, Japan is nobody's ally, and he stressed nationalism in Asia. So what is your opinion that Japan is no one's ally?

Q My name is Ulricha Wolfe; I am the head of the political section of the German Embassy. I would like to get back to the notion of nationalism, and I would like to subscribe to what the ambassador of Denmark said about the very negative connotation that nationalism has in Europe and specifically in Germany due to our history. I think that you can overall observe a rise in nationalism here in East Asia. You can see the impact of this on many levels. First if you look at the level of military capacity here in East Asia, it's very high, and also the level of political integration. Of course I am talking as a European, I think the level of political integration is surprisingly low if you look at what the East Asian nations could gain from it. Also there's much to be gained if the trade would be liberalized. What is your assessment of this impact of nationalism here in East Asia?

A It's really a pleasure to respond to your question from Germany for a number of reasons. I of course understand rather well why nationalism is downgrading in Germany. I also understand why chancellor Schroeder had the support of the German people in his opposition to the war in Iraq. Some of my closest friends in New Hampshire are bi-national, so we talk about these things all the time. But there is an analogy in the connection that you're making from Western Europe and the rise of the EC (EU), the rise of the EC and possible extension of the concept to East Asia. We should never forget that when John Monet and the others at the time were coming together to form the treaty of Rome

in 1957-8, that their overwhelming goal, and Adenauer made this statement himself most clearly when he said: "none of us could be fooled by these issues of economic cooperation in the coal and steel community" at the root of what we are doing is a political foaporshma between France and Germany so as to never again see the revival of what we've lived through in Europe.

That lesson that there was a deeply political heat to the establishment of the European community and now the EU, has been ignored in East Asia, just as it has been ignored in the western hemisphere: there is no analogy, the European model has no application to the attempts that have been made and are being made in East Asia, and the rather foolish attempts that are being made in the western hemisphere under the context of a so-called free trade area of the Americas. The ambassador from Portugal will fully understand what I'm talking about when I say Brazil's opposition to a USA-led western hemisphere operation will absolutely prevent that from coming into existence. That's why I have said that the lesson that some Europeans know is that nationalism has yet to halt. That lesson has not been learned in other parts of the world. Whether it will take more horror to learn it, I do not know, but we shouldn't fool ourselves because Europe regards nationalism as the depth of irrationality, that enlightenment if it is that, will be accepted elsewhere in the world, it's sad to say I don't think that is the case.



《 》

1.		
94-01		Jacques Attali
94-02	混在	
94-03	中國	
94-04	21 가	Paul Kennedy
94-05	/	/
94-06	UR ·	
94-07		/
94-08	円高	
94-09		
94-10		
95-01		:
95-02		
95-03	가	
95-04	: 2000	James Laney
95-05	가	
95-06	가	
95-07	: 가 가	
95-08		
95-09	·	
95-10		
95-11		
95-12		
96-01		

96-02 가

96-03有感

96-04

96-05

96-06對, 兩立 가 가?

96-07 派生金融商品

96-08

96-09, ,

96-10 轉機

96-11 WTO

97-01 難局 : 前提
複數勞組

97-02, 가

97-03 韓寶 教訓

97-04

97-05 虛實: 韓寶事態 教訓

97-06

97-07

97-08 高齡化 社會 財政危機

97-09 外換危機

97-10 가

98-01 經濟奇籍 가?

98-02 가

98-03 -

98-04

98-05 -

99-01

99-02

99-03

99-04 21

99-05

00-01 2000

00-02

00-03

00-04 高 低

00-05 , 가?

00-06

00-07 가

00-08

01-01

01-02 5

2. ()

94-01 UR •

94-02 - 가 /

94-03 円高

94-04

95-01 /

95-02 : • 가

95-03 WTO

96-01

96-02

97-01 / /

98-01 成長要因 成長潜在力 展望

98-02 ASEAN諸國間

98-03	The Global Trading System: Challenges Ahead	Wan-Soon Kim / Nakgyoon Choi
98-04		
00-01	Financial Crisis and Industry Policy in Korea	Young Sae Lee / YoungSeung Jung
01-01		
01-02		
3.	()	
94-01	21 가	Paul Kennedy
94-02		Ronald Morse
94-03	, 가	Toyoo Gyohten
94-04	:	Allen Sinai
94-05	가	John Williamson
94-06	The Promises of the WTO for the Trading Community	Arther Dunkel
95-01		Charles Dallara
95-02		Allen Sinai
95-03	,	Lester Thurow
95-04	-	Robert Scalapino
95-05		James Baker III
95-06	•	Anne Krueger
95-07	-	Hisao Kanamori
96-01	Prospects of Global Economy in 1996	Allen Sinai
96-02	(EU)	Örström Möller
96-03	OECD	Donald Johnston
96-04		Francis Fukuyama
96-05		A.W. Clausen
97-01		Wendy Dobson

97-02	•	William J. Perry
97-03		Donald K. Hunn
98-01		Edward M. Graham
98-02	: •	W. Anthony Lake
98-03	:	Donald P. Gregg
98-04		Juergen B. Donges
98-05	- 20	Guy Sorman
99-01	•	Marcus Noland
99-02	-	Kenneth S. Curtis
99-03	:	Donald Johnston / Hubert Neiss
99-04	가	Hugh T. Patrick
99-05	:	Rudiger Dornbusch
00-01	,	James P. Rooney
00-02	2000	Charles Dallara / Robert Hormats

4. Occasional Paper Series

00-01	:	Stephen W. Bosworth
00-02	:	
00-03		
00-04		Kenneth S. Curtis
00-05		Morris Goldstein
00-06	WTO • FTA	Jeffrey Schott /
00-07		Anne O. Krueger
00-08	:	Marcus Noland
00-09	Knowledge	Andrew Fraser
00-10	新 •	C. Fred Bergsten
01-01	2001 ,	Kenneth S. Curtis
01-02	對韓	Marcus Noland

01-03	3C		Jeffrey D. Jones
01-04		,	John Naisbitt
01-05	IMF		Stanley Fischer
01-06		10	Dominic Barton
01-07			Ronald McKinnon
01-08	新		Pierre Jacquet
02-01	再發,	:	Carlos Massad
02-02			Martin Wolf
02-03	•		Marcus Noland
02-04		: 가	Allen Sinai
02-05	:		The Rt. Hon. Patricia Hewitt MP
02-06	9 • 11	:	가?
			Francis Fukuyama
02-07		•	Barry Eichengreen
02-08	,	?	Kenneth S. Curtis
02-09			Marcus Noland
02-10	:		Jagdish Bhagwati
02-11	2003		Paul F. Gruenwald
02-12			John B. Taylor
02-13	9 • 11		Thomas C. Hubbard
02-14	,		C. Fred Bergsten
02-15	IT		Peter F. Cowhey
03-01			Allen Sinai
03-02	OECD가		Donald Johnston
03-03	•		Charles Morrison
03-04			Phil Gramm
03-05	•	가	Hans Tietmeyer
03-06			Eisuke Sakakibara

04-01 2004

Allen Sinai

04-02

Marcus Noland

04-03

韓·美·日

Hugh T. Patrick / Gerald Curtis

5. 가

• FTA 虛實

• A Foreign Businessman's Observations on the Korean Economy & Other Things

William Oberlin

6.

• The Global Economy and Korea

編

• The Multilateral Trading and Financial System

編

• Major Issues for the Global Trade and Financial System

編

• 韓美

/ C. Fred Bergsten 編

• 韓美

/ C. Fred Bergsten 編

• 英美

/ C. Fred Bergsten 編

• 韓美

編

• International Next Generation Leaders' Foun()

編

• International Next Generation Leaders' Foun()

編

• International Next Generation Leaders' Foun()

編

• International Next Generation Leaders' Foun()

編

•

編

•

編

• Policy Priorities for the Unified Korean Economy

/

編

• The Fifty Year of the GATT/WTO: Past Performance and Future Challenges

/

編

•

/

編

•

編

• For Better Tomorrow: Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century

ASEM Vision Group

• 6

• 21

編

- 2000 編
- Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Emerging Market Perspectives / 編
- Rebuilding the International Financial Architecture (EMEPPG) 編
Emerging Markets Encinent Persons Group
- () 編
- :
- () 編
- -
- () 編
- -
- 10 編
- John Williamson
- , 가 가? Robert Mundell
- , 編
- , 가? Barry Eichengreen
- , 가? Paul Kennedy / Bernard K. Gordon

2006年 3月 13日 印刷

2006年 3月 13日 發行

發行人 司空 壹
發 行

159

2505

印 刷

() 2273-7011

ISBN 89-86828-54-5

가 7,000

유럽의 어느 도시를 가도, 한국인이어서 가슴 벅찬 순간이 있습니다



이미 세계인의 생활필수품이 된 휴대폰! 세계인의 마음을 사로잡는 제품을 만들기 위한 기업들의 경쟁도 갈수록 치열해지고 있습니다. 그런데 휴대폰을 사용하는 세계인 다섯 명 중 한 명은 대한민국 제품을 사용하고 있습니다. 영국이 2005년 최고의 휴대폰으로 선정한 것도 프랑스에서 가장 많이 팔리는 것도, 러시아의 젊은이들이 감탄하고 중국의 젊은이들이 가장 갖고 싶어 하는 것도 모두 우리가 만든 휴대폰입니다. 하지만, 우리가 이 정도로 만족할 수는 없습니다. 우리는 더 많은 세계인이 우리 기술로, 우리 제품으로 통하게 만들어야 합니다. IT기술을 선도하는 우리의 지력을 세계가 확인할 수 있도록...



세계 앞에 코리아가 있습니다

드 해나의 가족 삼성전자 SAMSUNG

IGE 세계경제연구원
Institute for Global Economics

서울 강남구 삼성동 159 무역센터 2505호
전화 : 551-3334/7, FAX : 551-3339
E-mail : igenet@igenet.com
(Website)http://www.igenet.com



9 788986 828542
ISBN 89-86828-54-5

정가 7,000원